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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The basic hypothesis of this study contended that the National 
War College, located in Washington, D.C., was planned by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff and was developed to be the capstone of the nation's 
military educational system. This was a departure from an earlier con­
clusion made by Masland and Radway which indicated that the National 
War College had already reached the pinnacle of military higher educa­
tion.^ It was the contention of the author of this study, however, 
that the National War College never reached that position. Rather, the 
institution has shared the summit of professional military education 
with both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and with the three 
services War Colleges which were already in existence when the National 
War College was founded.
In a second hypothesis of the study it was proposed that despite 
inter-service rivalry which contributed to the situation, it appeared 
that the mission of the College and that of its sister institutions re­
quired a depth and breadth unique to each, and this prevented any
"'■John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars 
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957) p. 141. See also War Department Letter, Office of the 
Adjutant General, 4 April 1946, "National War College," Record Group 218 
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers (Combined Chiefs of Staff, 352, 1946- 
1947, Section 4, Box No. 72), The National Archives.
- 1-
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2institution from becoming supreme in the military education system.
These senior service colleges appeared to be alike in student 
clientele, methods of instruction, curricula, organization and func­
tions. This similarity gave rise to perplexing questions about their 
relationship with one another as well as the justification for all five 
institutions. Accordingly, it was contended in a third hypothesis that 
while it appeared that one could describe accurately the interrelation­
ship among the colleges, one could not answer simply whether or not all 
are required. The concern of the present study, therefore, was to in­
vestigate the development of the National War College and its peer 
institutions, and to examine the interrelationships that exist among 
these Senior Service Colleges. Accordingly, an investigation into the 
reasons for the establishment of the National War College and the other 
Senior Service Schools was made, and an assessment of why the multiple 
institutions exist was carried out.
The present account is significant because the interrelationships 
that exist among the National War College and the other senior services 
schools seem to be both misunderstood by the civilian sector and ignored 
by the military. An attempt was, therefore, made in this report to 
clarify for both elements the relationships existing between the National 
War College and the other Senior Service institutions. Additionally, 
inasmuch as very little was written concerning the National War College 
prior to the appearance of the work done by Masland and Radway, and 
since very little writing of academic significance has been added in the 
ensuing years, the present research should help to fill the void. Fur­
ther, by probing factors leading to the development of the National War 
College, reasons for the existence of a unique military institution for
the study of strategy and policy and training of political and military 
analysts and decision makers should become clearer.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3The main focus of this study was the thirty year period 1945-1975. 
These were the formative years of the National War College and include 
a period of three great conflicts —  part of World War II, the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War —  when military leaders were called upon not only 
to conduct military operations but also to participate in the subsequent 
peace negotiations. The National War College was an important element 
in the preparation of those leaders for their ultimate roles, thus this 
period of the development of the National War College closely parallel 
the period when strategy and policy studies became a key part of the 
curriculum of advanced military higher education. For background pur­
poses it was necessary to discuss many events outside of the primary 
period of this study. However, such discussions were limited to those 
that were necessary to validate the historical purposes.
Since the development of the National War College is a relatively 
recent historical event, much of what has been written in other docu­
ments about the College is based on eyewitness accounts which are 
naturally subject to bias because of the contemporary nature of the 
events. While reliance had to be placed on a number of these eyewitness 
accounts during the conduct of this study, care was taken to eliminate 
biases as much as possible. The techniques of oral history procedures 
described by William W. Moss was utilized in order to fill gaps in both 
eyewitness accounts and in the written materials that were available. 
However, that in itself is a limitation because as Moss admits, a major 
limitation of the oral history method is that the resultant study is not
an exhaustive presentation of all relevant data, rather it is a recol-
2
lection of human experiences within the context of a remembered past.
2
William W. Moss, Oral History Program Manual (New York: Prager
Publishers, 1974), p. 8.
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4Journal articles, newspaper accounts, Department of Defense studies, 
service publications, and unpublished sources were used in the study.
There were few, if any, other publications dealing with the College.
Most of these sources required extensive analysis and internal criti­
cism to determine their accuracy. Questionnaires, interviews, and some 
quantitative data were employed to substantiate the evidence gained 
from primary and secondary sources. Comparative data, especially involv­
ing the other Senior Service Colleges, were also extensively utilized.
It is important that the reader understand special terms used in 
this inquiry. Within the context of the investigation, the term "strategy" 
refers to the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill 
the ends of policy. The term, strategy, is concerned not merely with 
the employment of forces, but also with their effect; particularly at 
the national and international levels. The term "policy" as used in 
this paper means the formulation of concepts, principles, and interests 
of a State based on its national strength, will, resources and goals. 
Another term that was frequently used is "The National Defense Univer­
sity," that military institution located in Washington, D. G. which at 
the beginning of the study was composed of the National War College 
and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces Staff 
College at Norfolk, Virginia was added to the University before the 
study was completed. The university is a joint service institution 
under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another term, "Senior 
Service Colleges," was used throughout this study. This referred to 
the National Defense University (.less the Armed Forces Staff College) 
and each of the separate armed services war colleges (i.e., the Army War 
College, the Naval War College, and the Air War College). Senior
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5Service Colleges are generally considered to be upper level graduate 
institutions corresponding to civilian graduate level universities and 
colleges. They do not include the Armed Forces Staff College or the 
Command and General Staff Colleges of the separate services since these 
are generally classified as lower level institutions corresponding to 
undergraduate civilian colleges and universities. Therefore, these 
institutions were not included in the study. Nor does the term "Senior 
Service Colleges" include the separate services officer professional or 
technical schools which are considered equivalent to vocational or 
technical colleges. The term "Senior Service Schools" is synonymous 
with and was often used in the report in lieu of the term "Senior Ser­
vice Colleges."
Two other terms should be especially noted by the reader —  "train­
ing" and "education". Although these terms as used in military parlance 
usually indicate the same function and are used interchangeably, with no 
clear distinction between the two, for the purposes of this study "train­
ing" referred to instruction that was oriented to a particular military 
speciality designed to develop a technical skill. It includes technical 
instruction of military units as well as individuals. "Training" thus 
is the type of instruction that may be given directly to the individual 
and organizations, and is job related. "Education," on the other hand, 
implied instruction or individual study for the purpose of intellectual 
development and the cultivation of the mind, wisdom, and judgment. 
Accordingly, as used here, it is the type of learning that prepares one 
to deal with novel situations and goes beyond job assigment.
The seminal work done by Masland and Radway on military education 
is the general reference usually found to be available in most libraries
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
and thus has become a standard reference. Nevertheless, the volume is 
limited to a general discussion of military education and contains little 
on the development of the National War College, and the requirement for 
all the Senior Service Colleges. Masland and Radway's investigation is 
nonetheless a beginning and forms the basis for the study. A book edited 
by Lawrence J. Korb supplements Masland and Radway's work and was used 
throughout the study. Its authors provided some analysis of senior 
service education. For example, it contains "The War Colleges: Education 
for What?" in which Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. examines the goals, mis­
sions, objectives and curricula of the War Colleges. It also contains 
Frederick H. Hartmann's "The War College in Perspective" which, while 
not limited to the National War College, does offer the author's insight 
into the need for its development by pointing up shortcomings in the 
offerings of the three service War Colleges. In addition to these secondary 
sources, George S. Pappas' work Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College: 
1901-1967^ was used extensively and provided some details on the estab­
lishment and organization of the Army War College and the National War
£
College. In Professors of War Ronald Spector examined the establishment
3
Masland and' Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education
and National Policy.
4
Lawrence J. Korb, ed., The System for Educating Military Officers 
in .the U.S.. International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9. 
^Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967).
George S. Pappas, Prudents Futuri: The U.S. Army War College 
1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Walsworth Publishing Co., 1967).
'Sfev
^Ronald Spector, Professor of War (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval
War College Press, 1977).
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7and growth of the National War College and the Naval War College.
Another secondary work used was Clarence W. Hannon's Graduate Education 
Within the Armed Forces,^ in which he discussed congressional attitudes 
toward graduate level education in the Armed Forces. Further, Hannon 
provided in his volume a historical perspective of graduate education in 
the services. He gave environmental forces and trend impacting on gradu­
ate service education, and ha reviewed graduate degree programs within 
each service.
As a supplement to this, Joseph S. King reviewed the weaknesses 
of advanced civilian education programs, discussed officers perception 
of advanced civilian schooling, and provided a projection of civilian 
schooling for the future in his "A Study of Army Advanced Civilian
g
Schooling Programs." This account was also used as was one that is 
more directly related to senior service education by Paul T. Karschina 
titled Education, The War Colleges and Professional Military Develop­
ment in which he generally assessed the role of military education in
the professional development of American military leadership, and dis-
9
cussed supporting educational theory. Karschina also reviewed the 
history of military education, provided a fundamental thrust for 
military education, and appraised the Senior Service Colleges in the 
overall scheme of professional military education. The National War
^Clarence W. Hannon, Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces 
(Battle Creek, Mich.: Defense Documentation Center, 1974).
g
Joseph King, "A Study of the Armys' Advanced Civilian Schooling 
Programs," MA Thesis, (U. S. Army Command and General Staff College,
1973).
9
Paul T. Karschina, Education, The War Colleges and Professional 
Military Development (Washington: The National War College Strategic
Research Group, n. d.).
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8College's pamphlet Fort Lesley J. McNair: Home of the National War
College and The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is an account 
in which the authors provides a brief history of the post and some 
events leading to the establishment of the two Senior Service Schools.^ 
Finally, Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, a former Commadant of 
the National War College, provided in a Sperryscope article a comprehen­
sive review of the early days of the College, and this was very useful 
in the study.^
Primary sources that were used in the study included The War
Department's "Gerow Board Report" in which the board members established
12
the need for the College, The War Department's "Eddy Board Report"
13wherein the board detailed the Army's position regarding the War College,
the U. S. Navy War College's second "Annual Report of the President" in
which the College's President depicted navy bias against the National 
14
War College, and which contained Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner's
The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair: Home of the
National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces 
(Washington: The National War College Press, 1967).
"^Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, "The National War 
College," Sperryscope 16 (1962) 1: 2-5.
12
U. S. War Department, Report of War Department Military Educa­
tion Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas: Command and General Staff College, 1946).
13U. S. Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the 
Army Board on Educational System for Officers (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 
Command and General Staff College, 1949).
^U. S. Naval War College, "The Report of the President 1972-1973," 
Naval War College Review 26, (September - October 1973) 2.
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9comments and comparisons of the Navy War College and the National War 
College. Additionally, The National War College Institutional Report 
for the Evaluation of the National War College by the Office of the 
American Council on Education was used extensively.^ Other reports 
which played an important role in the investigation are the Report of 
the POD Committee on Excellence in Education —  The Senior Services 
Colleges; Conclusions and Initiatives commonly referred to as the 
Clements Report.^ In this work, the Clements Board provided an over­
view of the Senior Service Schools, discussed their curricula, teaching 
methodology, their faculties, their cooperative degree programs, their 
research programs, and recommended future initiatives in these, areas•
The Board’s most salient recommendation was one leading to the establish­
ment of the National Defense University by combining the National War 
College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Another primary 
source used was the U. S. Defense Department’s Report on Senior Service 
College Curriculum Study which supplements the Clements Report already 
mentioned."*^ The authors of this report established a requirement for
U. S. National War College, The National War College Institu­
tional Report for the Evaluation of the National War College by the 
Office of the American Council on Education (Washington: The National
War College, 1974).
16Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on the POD 
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Services Colleges: 
Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington; Department of Defense, 1975).
^U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Senior Service College 
Curriculum Study (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
10
a Common Core Curriculum for use at all schools, established a Mission-
Specific Curriculum for each separate school which would be supportive
of and complement the Common Core Curriculum while stressing its own
unique mission orientation, and established an Elective Program which
permitted the tailoring of each student's educational experience to his
background and service needs. Still another Department of Defense Study
was the Plan for Establishment of The National Defense University wherein
the study members described plans and procedures for consolidating the
18National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Included were specific procedures for establishing a single presidency,
administrative staff, board of visitors, research program, management
systems activity, external program activity, and auxiliary services.
Another most useful primary source was the National War College's
19
Statistical Data for Classes of 1947 thru 1959. Presented in chart form 
in this document are certain data that was descriptive of the individual 
in the various classes. The charts reflected information by branch of 
service for each year during the period and contained average age of stu­
dents when entering the college, their length of service and rank on enter­
ing, information on academic degrees held, prior attendance at Senior Ser­
vice Schools, types of assignment on completion of the courses and percent­
age of those graduating who were promoted to general or flag ratings. It 
is especially significant that no attempt was made in this document to 
analyze or to draw conclusions from the data presented; this was left
18U.S. Department of Defense, Plan for Establishment of the 
National Defense University (Washington: Department of Defense, 1976).
19
U.S. National War College, Statistical Data for Classes of 1947 
Through 1959 (Washington: The National War College, n. d.).
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to the reader. The facts were presented as information only. The final
primary sources used were the National War College "Commandant's Annual 
20
Reports." These not only provided observations of the College's 
leader during the academic year, but it also provided an annual report 
of the Board of Consultants. Additionally, in it the Commandant ex­
amined research, seminars, area studies, lecture programs,the budget 
and operating cost for the college during the year. He also reviewed 
the curriculum and provided statistical data on the students attending.
Other primary sources used included information found in the National 
Archives, the Library of Congress, at the National Defense University 
Archives and Library, and in the Pentagon's Army Library. Additionally, 
other important secondary sources were found at the U. S. Army Training 
and Doctrine Command Technical Library (Fort Monroe, Virginia), the 
Armed Forces Staff College Library and Archives (Norfolk, Virginia), 
the Military Collection at the Hughes Library at Old Dominion University, 
and at Swem Library, the College of William and Mary. Sources were 
also obtained through military inter-1iberary loans involving libraries 
at the Army Archives (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.), the 
Naval War College (Newport, R.I.), and the Air War College (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, Alabama).
Results of the investigation begin in Chapter two with an in depth 
study devoted to antecedents of the National War College, thus establish­
ing the historical beginnings of war college type of education. Factors 
influencing the development of Senior Service Colleges in general, and
20
U. S. National War College, Commandants Annual Report (Washington: 
The National War College, 1947-1975).
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the National War College specifically, are. established in Chapter III. 
Roles, attitudes, and influences of military and civilian leaders in 
the development of the National War College are identified in Chapter IV. 
A comparison of the development of the National War College curriculum 
and instructional strategies in relation to that of the other Senior 
Service Colleges is made in Chapter .V. Finally, reasons for the exis­
tence of the National War College and the other Senior Service Colleges 
are examined in Chapter VI, and summary and conclusions of the study 
are presented in Chapter VII.
The National War College is called a college even though it is 
not an accredited, degree-granting institution. The College has been 
evaluated a number of times by the Office on Educational Credit of the
American Council on Education in order to determine how well it is
achieving its objectives as a higher educational institution, and to
assist in determining the amount of graduate-level transfer credits
21
which can reasonably be recommended for its programs. It is not the
type of college one usually thinks of, and its curricula emphasis is
placed on things other than war. In fact, one former president of a
War College said "It is far from correct to assert that the War College
22
prepares only for war." It deals both with technical military sub­
jects as well as conventional civilian academic studies. Therefore, its 
development was an important aspect of not only military education but
21
The National War College, Institutional Report for the Evalua­
tion of the College by the Office on Educational Credit of the American 
Council on Education 1973-1974 (Washington: The National War College,
1974).
22
Admiral Richard G. Colbert, "War College Education and the 
Future" in United States Naval Proceedings 99, Number 11/849 (November 
1973), p. 108.
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also all of higher education because it exemplified how unique needs 
resulted in the creation of post secondary educational institutions.
It was the intent of the completed investigation to discover through 
the development of the National War College, the interrelationship that 
existed among the Senior Service Colleges and reasons the multiple 
institutions exists. To accomplish this, it was necessary to first 
understand and appreciate its historical antecendents. Those beginnings 
are reported in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER I I
HISTORICAL ANTECENDENTS
Several attempts were made during the Constitutional Convention
>
in 1787 to authorize a national institution of higher education but all
of the proposals were rejected.'*' Even though the Constitution as
finally written and passed made no reference to education, there was a
2
continuing interest among its authors and others. The first six
Presidents of the United States all agreed on the desirability of a
national university, and Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and John Quincy
Adams even sent requests to Congress asking for the establishment of
3
such an institution. In addition, George Washington willed fifty 
shares of his stock in the Potomac Canal Company to be used to establish 
a national university. James Smithson, an English scientist, bequeathed an
For a discussion of the historical development of higher educa­
tion in the United States and early American desires for a national 
university see Lawrence Gladieux and Thomas R. Wolanian, Congress and 
the Colleges; The National Politics of Higher Education (Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 3-13.
2
Homer D. Babbidge, Jr. and Robert M. Rozenweig, The Federal 
Interest in Higher Education (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1962), p. 1. Also see Clifton Conrad and Joseph Cosand, The Implications 
of Federal Education Policy (Washington: The American Association for
Higher Education, 1976), p. 4.
3Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith, American Higher Education:
A Documentary History 2 vol. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1961), 1:157.
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amount of money for the purpose of founding the Smithsonian Institution
4
and he left an additional amount for establishing a national university.
In spite of all this support for a national university, such an institu­
tion was not established. Rudolph contends that the idea became a dream 
that often recurred in American History but never reached fruition 
primarily because of hostile interests and beliefs.^ This dream was 
partially realized in 1946 when the National War College was established.
Purposes of the College were "To prepare selected personnel of the 
armed forces and the State Department for the exercise of joint high 
level policy, command and staff functions, and for performance of 
strategic planning duties in their respective departments, and to pro­
mote the development of understanding [among the armed forces and other 
agencies of government as well as industry] which a.re an essential part
g
of a national war effort." This mission appears to coincide with the 
idea expressed by Benjamin Rush in October, 1788 for a federal university. 
Rush wanted a university that would prepare graduates for federal service.
4
Babbidge and Rozenweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education, 
p. 5. See also The Smithsonian Booklet, The Castle and Beyond prepared 
as a service to members of the Smithsonian Associates.
^Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University: A History
(New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 42.
g
Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff "Directives for the National War College (J.C.S. 962/38," 13 
October 1947, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record 
Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 
12-26-42. Section 7, Box 72) The National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^See notes to "Benjamin Russ on a Federal University, 1788" in 
Hofstadter and Smith, A Documentary History, vol. 1, p. 153.
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This mission further appears to answer the desire of Washington for 
establishment of a national institution with the "Primary object [of 
educating] our Youth in the science of Government [and in the art of
g
war]." Establishment of The National War College would also seem to
be in agreement with the notions of Jefferson, Washington and Noah
Webster that Americans should be provided with an alternative to a
9
European education. The idea of a national war college appears to fit
closer than any other institution to the notion of establishing a
national university.
Just as the origins of American colleges of the colonial period
can be traced to European universities, so can the National War College
trace its antecedents to Europe. Henry Barnard, contended that the
officers of the armed forces of the colonies were trained abroad;
especially the prominent colonial artillery and engineer officers who
xl
served during the Revolutionary War. We, therefore, must look for 
the beginnings of high level American military education to England and 
Germany.
See "Washington to Congress on a National University, 1790,
1796," Ibid., p. 158.
9
Babbidge and Rozenweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education,
p. 5.
■^For discussions of early American colleges see Frederick Rudolph, 
The American Colleges and Universities, pp. 1-135, and also Hofstadter 
and Smith, A Documentary History, pp. 1-583.
11Henry Barnard, Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in 
the Science and Art of War in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Sardinia, England, and the United States, revised from the 
original published by E. Steiger in 1872 in New York (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 719-720.
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During 1840-1849, Henry W. Halleck became the first person to call
12
for a professionally educated American military person. Halleck was
impressed with the training that was carried out by French military
13educators, particularly Jomini. However, Lieutenant Colonel Emory
Upton should be given credit for bringing the European system of military
14
education to the United States; particular the German techniques.
Writing in Professors of War, Roland Spector contends that "The Army
Schools derived their inspiration from the example of Germany military
education. Their model was the great Berlin Kriegsakademie which had
been founded by General Gerhardt von Scharnharst in 1810 to train officers
15for high command and general staff work. Upton, a protege of General
12
George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri; The U.S. Army War College 1901- 
1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: The Alumni Association of The U.S. War College 
in Association with Walsworth Publishing Company, 1967), p. 7.
13While impressed with Jomini, Halleck did not care much for the 
Prussian military educator Clausewitz. Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl 
Maria von Clausewitz were the foremost military thinkers and theorists 
of the nineteenth century; particularly during the Napoleonic era.
Jomini, although a native of Switzerland, became the leading teacher of 
military tactics and strategy in the French Army and was a great favorite 
of early twentieth century American military men. Clausewitz was perhaps 
the most renowned teacher at the Berlin Kriegsakademie (War Academy) and 
is most remembered for his military philosophy stressing the intangibles 
of leadership and politics in war. Clausewitz became a favorite of mid­
twentieth century American military officers. The theories and 
philosophies of both are still taught at the National War College and 
each of the separate services' war colleges. For discussions of Jomini, 
see Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of War, trans. C. H. Mendell and W.P. 
Craighill (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971) and also Jomini
and his Summary of War, ed. and intro. J. D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Pa: 
Stockpole Books, 1965). For discussions of Clausewitz see Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Carl von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976); also see Peter Paret, Clausewitz and 
The State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).
14Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College Press, 1977), p. 16.
15Ibid., p. 15.
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William Tecumseh Sherman, in the company of Major George A Forsyth and
Captain J. P. Sanger, took a trip around the world in 1876 to study
military activities and military schools that were established in Asia
and Europe. His visit took him to Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy,
Russia, Austria, Germany, France and England. It was the German military
educational system in which he was most interested. Prior to leaving
the United States, he received a letter from the War Department in
Washington, dated June 23, 1875 and signed by William W. Belknap,
Secretary of the Army, which instructed him to visit in Germany "The
schools for the instruction of officers in strategy, grand tactics,
applied tactics, and the higher duties in the art of war, and the
collection and compilation of such other information as might naturally
16
•jbe expected to be of utility to this Government." u While Upton was
generally impressed by the armies of Asia and Europe that he visited,
he was particularly impressed by the German military education system,
and on his return to the United States wrote a report in 1878 which
set the standard for American military higher education. In his
Armies of Asia and Europe, Upton concluded:
The corner-stone of the European staff system is the War 
Academy, and next in importance is the constant interchange 
between the staff and the line . The War Academy, and the
staff and the line, thus constitute the school of instruc­
tion for all of the great commanders of Europe, no less than 
for the staff officers whose province it is to assist them.-^
16Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official
Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, 
Austria, Germany, France and England (New York: Appleton and Company,
1878), p. iv.
17Ibid., p. 328.
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He further stated that:
Abroad, it is the universal theory that the art of war should 
be studied only after an officer has arrived at full manhood 
and therefore most governments have established post-graduate 
institutions for nearly all arms of service where meritorious 
officers from whatever sphere they may enter the army, may 
study strategy, grand tactics, and all the sciences connected 
with modern war. . . . .  The institutions for the training of the 
staff are known as War Academies, war schools and staff 
colleges; for the artillery and engineers and cavalry they are 
known generally as schools of application, or as advanced 
artillery and engineer courses. °
America did have some post-graduate training of its artillery 
officers; however, there were no war academy schools in the German, 
French and British tradition. The United States first approach to post­
graduate military education was made in 1867 with the establishment of 
the Artillery School of the United States Army at Fort Monroe, Virginia. 
The institution was designed largely for the instruction of artillerymen 
in light and heavy artillery tactics, the science of artillery, infantry 
tactics, history, strategy,, engineering, law (including military law,
international law, U. S. constitutional law), and mathematics (including
19
algebra, geometry, and plane trigometry). The instruction at this 
school was so successful that Upton, who later became its commander, 
suggested that the U. S. Army establish a similar post-graduate school 
for the infantry and cavalry; one to be located in Atlanta and the other 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He further suggested that the United 
State pay officers as military professors thereby obtaining a corps of 
professional instructors. He also recommended establishing a military
■^Ibid., pp. 362-363.
■^Ibid., pp. 363-364.
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educational department within the War Department to inspect army colleges
20
and to which military professors could be attached. Although a special 
bureau did not result, a post-graduate school for infantry and cavalry 
was established.
In 1881, General Sherman ordered that: "As soon as the requisite
number of troops can be assembled at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the com­
manding general Department of the Missouri will take measures to 
establish a school of application for infantry and cavalry similar to
21
the one now in operation for the artillery at Fort Monroe, Virginia."
Timothy K. Nenninger argues that although Sherman strongly believed in
military education and did much to improve the quality of the officer
corps, he was not prompted by high ideals in ordering the establishment
of the schools at Fort Leavenworth. Rather, he issued the order as a
concession to friends and families so their boys could escape company
duty in the Indian country. Sherman said: "The school at Leavenworth
may do some good, and be a safety-value for those who are resolved to
22
escape from the drudgery of garrison life at small posts." As it 
turned out, the Fort Leavenworth schools became excellent institutions 
for the training of infantry and cavalry officers for their roles in 
modern warfare. However, they still were not war academies in the 
European sense. According to Nenninger, Sherman wanted the Leavenworth
^Ibid., pp. 366-367.
21
Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: 
Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States 
Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 22.
22
Ibid., pp. 23. Also see Sherman to Sheridan, July 31, 1881. 
Letterbook 95, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress.
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schools to be like war academies and prepare officers for high command,
however, the officers assigned there were junior lieutenants who did
not have the stature for high level training. Their greatest need was
23
to develop competence in tactics, not strategy. It was not until de­
cades later that men of higher rank were assigned to Leavenworth. Even 
then, the curricular emphasis was on administrative, professional and 
tactical instruction. The first senior level military institution in 
the United States did not occur until the Naval War College was established.
The Naval War College was established on October 6, 1884, by order 
of the Secretary of the Navy. The driving force behind the establishment
of the new institution was Stephen Bleecher Luce and his concept of pro-
24
fessional education. In an address before the Newport Branch of The
Naval Institute on April 4, 1883, Commodore Luce proposed establishment
of a post-graduate course where officers might have the opportunity of
studying the science and art of war as well as the laws of war based on
25
marine international law. While he had previously expressed his ideas 
in an article titled "War Schools" published in Proceedings of the United 
States Naval Institute in 1883, Luce attributed the original idea for
23Ibid., p. 23.
24Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and the Beginnings 
of the U. S. Naval War College", Naval War College Review, 23, (January, 
1971), p. 51.
25
United States Naval War College, History of The United States 
Naval War College, 1884-1958 (Washington: Naval Department Library,
Washington Naval Yard Microfilm number MIC lh, 1959) p. 1. See also 
Stephen B. Luce, "The U. S. Naval War College," U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 36 (1910), p. 560.
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such a course to his meeting with General Sherman in 1865. However,
it was from the Army’s Artillery School at Fort Monroe and the new
Infantry and Cavalry Schools at Fort Leavenworth that he really derived 
27
his inspiration. He was particularly impressed by the Department of
Military Art and Science at Fort Monroe led by Emory Upton with whom he
exchanged correspondence. Upton at the time was the leading member of
28
faculty of the Artillery School. Luce said in a letter to his friend 
W. C. Church "I used to talk with my old lamented friend General Upton 
about it a great deal. He was enthusiastic and urged me on to make a
29
move in regard to it. But I have never seen my way clear until now."
Luce firmly believed that both intensive study and intellectual
effort were necessary preparations for conducting succes. ul operations
at sea. In his mind those in command at sea needed to comprehend the
theory of naval operations in addition to the techniques of the profession.
With both a theoretical and technical background, through which their own
actions could be seen, the student would posses a perspective of national
30
and international affairs. To this end, the first concern of Luce was
26Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings 
of the U. S. Navy War College," p. 51. See also Rear Admiral Austin M. 
Knight and Lieutenant William D. Pulson, History of the United States 
Naval War College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1916), p. 1.
27Ibid., p. 52.
28Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings 
of the Naval War College," p. 52. Also see Ronald Spector, Professors 
of War, pp. 14-15.
29John D. Hays and John B. Hattendorf, ed. The Writings of 
Stephen B. Luce (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1975), p. 11.
30Hayes and Hattendorf, Writings of Luce, p. 37.
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to organize a highly qualified faculty. He employed a friend, Captain
Alfred Thayer Mahan who was at the Naval Academy with him, and assigned
him to teach naval history and tactics. One of the most promising
officers of the navy at the time, and already distinguished as a writer
on naval education and naval warfare, Mahan was to later distinguish
himself both as an Admiral and as the second President of the Naval War
College. Luce also asked for "an officer learned in military science
who could best be supplied by the Army" and obtained Lieutenant Tasker
A. Bliss, who was discribed by the Army's Adjutant General as the most
accomplished officer in the profession. Bliss was Adjutant of the school
at Fort Monroe. He later served as Chief of Staff of the Army in World
War I. For the position as instructor in international law, Luce chose
James Russell Soley, prolific writer and distinguished lecturer at The
Lowell Institute. Soley had been head of the Department of English
31
Studies, History and Law at the Naval Academy. In addition to Mahan, 
Bliss and Soley, Commander Henry C. Taylor, the College's third presi­
dent, lectured on naval tactics. Also, Union Generals John C. Palfrey 
and George H. Gordon, and historian John C. Ropes lectured on military
For a complete discussion on the founding and early days of the 
Naval War College, see the United States Naval War College's History 
of The United States Naval War College, 1884-1958 (Washington: Naval
Department Library, Washington Naval Yard: Microfilm number MIC.lh,
1959), pp. 1-21. Also see, John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, ed., 
The Writings of Stephen B. Luce (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College,
1975); Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight and Lieutenant William D. Puleston, 
History of The United States Naval War College, (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, 1916); and Captain S. M. Barnes, Commander W.M. Kaufman 
and Commander H. T. Gannon, The United States Naval War College— A 
Staff Study of its Historical Background, Mission and Educational 
Philosophy, Principles and Concepts from Which the Second Year of the 
Course, in Naval Warfare Was Derived (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College,
1954).
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operations of the Civil War. These seven men formed the first faculty
of the College. A series of lectures by Soley highlighted the first
session, and became the foundation for the international law program
that gained worldwide recognition for the Naval War College. The army's
Lieutenant Bliss's contribution to The Naval War College was no less
outstanding. According to Ronald Spector, Bliss contributed the use of
a comparative method which ultimately helped to make naval warfare a
science. Spector says "He was a link between the new military science
as developed in the European staff schools and the naval officers who
32
were to apply it to sea warfare." He was nevertheless an anomaly at
33
the Naval War College because he was a soldier and not in the navy. 
However, Tasker Bliss not only became a distinguished instructor at the 
Naval War College, he also became one of the founders and the chief 
architect as well as the first President of The Army War College.
There were some senior military officers who during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century called for the creation of an Army 
War College or for some other type of post-graduate school specifically 
designed for Army officers. General Emory Upton, like many who followed 
him, wanted an Academy patterned after that in Germany. George Pappas 
cautioned that Upton did not maintain any thought of completely copying 
the Prussian organization nor the policy of its War Academy. In fact, 
Upton was known to have said: "West Point is, in my judgement, far
32
Ronald Spector, Professors of War, p. 29.
33Philip A. Crowl, "Education versus Training at the Naval War 
College: 1884-1974", Naval War College Review, 26 (Nov-Dee. 1973),
p. 2.
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superior to any academy abroad for preparatory training of officers.
But once in service, we have nothing to compare with the war academies
34
of Europe except the Artillery School." So, the call went out from 
Upton and others to create an Army War College.
As a result of the pressure for such an institution, particularly 
from Major General William H. Carter who made him aware of Upton's 
report, Secretary of War Elihu Root formally proposed an Army War Col­
lege. Just as the case with Stephen B. Luce when he proposed the Naval 
War College, Root met strong resistence from some senior officers of 
the War Department. Also like Luce, he realized that congressional 
support was necessary for an official reoganization to accommodate 
such an institution, but he did not seek the support of key members of 
the Congress as did Luce. Rather, "He took unilateral and executive 
action in the name of the President by establishing a War College with 
general staff functions. . . .by Special Order Number 42, 19 February 
1900. . . .and Special Order Number 145, 21 June 1900."^ In the early 
days of the institution, there were fears among its proponents that it 
would become merely a general staff organization even though Brigidier 
General William Ludlow, who served as President of the board charged 
with bringing the College into existence, and General (then Lieutenant 
Colonel) William Carter planned it as an institution where emphasis 
would be placed on education and not general staff functions. It was,
"^George S. Pappas, The U. S. Army War College 1901-1967, p . 8. 
^Ibid., pp. 13-14.
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however, not until 1903 that the Army War College became a functioning
reality. The first class did not report until 1904 and consisted of
nine majors and captains; one of whom was to gain lasting recognition
36
as an eminent American military hero— Captain John J. Pershing.
It should be noted that according to George S. Pappas, The Naval
War College and The Army War College were quite similiar in character:
Instructional methods were almost identical, although 
the Naval War College scheduled more lectures. The 
Naval College placed greater reliance on outside ex­
pertise, including civilian academicians, although 
The Army War College was gradually scheduling more 
and more visiting lecturers. Each, moreover, empha­
sized the tactics and strategy of its own service.37
However, unlike The Naval War College, the faculty of The Army War
College and The General Staff continue to work so closely together that
at times it was difficult to distinguish the two. In fact, until 1916
when The National Defense Act forbade individuals of The General Staff
from serving both as general staff officers and as members of the
College faculty, it was customary for the military members to serve in
the dual capacity. Nonetheless, close cooperation between the two con-r
tinued to exist until 1917 when The War College closed for the duration
of World War I as an academic institution. When the College was
reopened in 1919, it was called The General Staff College; and in 1921
in order to reflect mandates of The National Defense Act of June, 1920,
36Ibid., p. 41. It should be noted that although Pershing was a 
member of the first class, he did not graduate because of reassignment 
to the Far East. (See Pappas, p. 47).
37
lb id., p . 78.
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the original name - The Army War College was reestablished. As World 
War I drew to a close, a weakness in the curriculum of The Army War 
College became evident. There was found to be insufficient instruction 
in industrial preparedness. As a result, the need for an industrial 
course for the military became obvious.
Problems of industrial mobilization during World War I were well 
known to both military and civilian leaders. Public disclosures of war 
time failures in the field of supply led to a congressional investiga­
tion. Out of this investigation came the requirement to train military 
men to plan for industrial mobilization. As a result, on February 25, 
1924 The Army Industrial College was established. The Army Industrial 
College continued to function until 1941 when it was closed for the 
duration of World War II. When the College resumed operation in January, 
1946, its name was changed to its present title, The Industrial College 
of The Armed Forces. It was reconstituted as a joint educational 
institution operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1948
with The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps serving as equal partners
38
in the staff, faculty, and student body.
The Industrial College of The Armed Forces became the only Senior 
Service College with the primary mission of providing a course of study 
in resource management for purposes of national security. Its curriculum 
was designed to address management skills and practices related to human 
and material resources, analytical techniques, global resource issues
38
Hayden J. Price, "Student Diversity— ICAF's Unique Solution" 
Armed Forces Management 15 (March 1969): 68.
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and the national economy.
Just as the need for instruction in industrial subjects became 
evident in World War I, the need for education in greater interservice 
cooperation became obvious during World War II. This led to the 
creation of the Joint Army and Navy Staff College during the war.
A War Department memorandum in June 1943 authorized the establish­
ment of The Joint Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) under the juris­
diction of The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The purpose of this College was 
to provide a special course of instruction for qualified Army, Navy,
Air Corps, and Marine Corps officers who were selected to increase their
efficiency in the performance of command and staff duties in unified and
40
coordinated operations of Army and Navy forces. The College, intended 
as a temporary activity during the War, was located in Washington, D.C. 
in order to maintain close contact with the high command of the services 
and also in order to take advantage of existing facilities.
The Joint Chiefs established the criteria for the faculty and 
students. The Commandant had to be a graduate of both The Army War 
College and of The Naval War College. Military faculty members had to 
be graduates of one of the Senior Service Colleges and also had to pos­
sess experience in joint operations. Civilian instructors and lecturers 
had to be distinguished in fields such as government and military history.
39
National Defense University, "Fact Sheet", (March 1, 1978).
^War Department Memorandum No. W350-154-3, "Army and Navy Staff 
College" (Documents Number A45254 and A44766)" 4 June 1943 Modern 
Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records 
of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352:12-26-42 Section 1, Box 
241), The National Archives.
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Sixty percent of the students were to be from the Army, forty percent
from the Navy and from the Air Force. As a minimum, each had to be the
equivalent of a Lieutenant Colonel with the exception of some Majors who
had distinguished service records. In this regard, Colonels could not
be over 45 years old, Lieutenant Colonels not over 40 and Majors could
41
not be over 35 years old. Based on an agreement between Admiral Leahy
and Secretary of State Edward.R. Stettinus, three foreign service officers
of the State Department were assigned to each class beginning in Septem- 
42
ber, 1944.
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was selected as the first Com­
mandant of ANSCOL. The curriculum of the College was to be prepared by 
the Commandants of the Army's Command and General Staff School, the 
Naval War College and the Air Force's School of Applied Tactics. ANSCOL 
opened on Jun 1, 1943 at Georgetown University as a mid-level service 
college. It later evolved into the National War College.
There was, however, one other Senior Service School. The Air War 
College, the top professional school of the United States Air Force, 
was established at Maxwell Air Force Base (Montgomery), Alabama in March
41
Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 185, 3 January 1943 Modern Military 
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of The 
United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 1, Box 241),
The National Archives.
42
Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 952/1, 8 August 1944 Modern Military 
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record 218, Records of The United 
States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 2, Box 241), The
National Archives.
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431946 with Major General Orvil A. Anderson as the first commandant.
Formed as a constituent part of the Air University, the Air War College 
became an important part of the family of Senior Service Schools.
However, because of the lateness of its founding (only four months 
prior to the National War College), and partly due to the fact that 
planning for the National War College had been underway for almost a 
year when it was estblished, the Air War College does not serve as a 
significant antecedent of the National War College.
One can conclude, therefore, that the establishment of the 
National War College partially fulfilled the desire expressed by George 
Washington and others for a national university. However, like all its 
antecedents and like the American universities of the Colonial period, 
the National War College was greatly influenced by European educational 
institutions; particularly, military schools. Emory Upton, having 
studied the military schools of Europe, especially the German techniques 
for training military officers for service at the highest levels, imported 
the German system of military training to the United States. Although 
America had already established post-graduate training for officers at 
the Artillery School, Fort Monroe, Virginia, it was not like that of 
the German War Academy. The establishment of the schools at Fort 
Leavenworth were also not up to par with the German standards. It was 
not until the Naval War College was established that the United States
/  Q
Ed Gates, "New Look at The Air War College," Air Force Magazine 
60 (January, 1977), p. 54. See also Masland and Radway, Soldiers and 
Scholars, p. 328.
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had a comparable institution. This college, along with the Army War 
College which was founded twenty years later, gave the United States 
the capability to train officers for their traditional technical roles 
in military operations, and also enabled the armed forces to train their 
military students to become proficient in strategy and policy thereby 
making it possible to assign them to the highest levels of government 
operations as well as permitting them to assume high level military 
command and staff positions. The late date of establishment of The Air 
War College made that institution an insignificant factor in the estab­
lishment of the National War College. However, the Industrial College 
of the Armed Forces and the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) were 
not only significant forerunners of the National War College but both 
added new dimensions to post-graduate training of American military 
officers; the former in industrial mobilization training and the latter 
in training for joint and combined operations.
Although ANSCOL was not a Senior Service School as envisaged in 
this study, its importance in the founding of the National War College 
should not be underestimated because it was from this temporary school 
that the National War College emerged as a permanent Senior Service 
College following World War II. Therefore, in order to determine 
factors influencing the development of the National War College, it 
was important that reasons for establishing ANSCOL be investigated along 
with causes leading to the establishment of the Industrial College of 
the Armed Forces, the Army War College, and Naval War College. An 
analysis of the establishment of each of these schools will help to 
provide insight into the founding of the National War College. Since 
the Naval War College was the first established, an examination of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reasons leading to its founding will be the first concern of the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER III
FACTORS INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENT OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES
Senior Service Schools were established for purposes other than 
that of command and staff schools, and officer career schools. These 
latter institutions were lower level schools designed to teach 
officers fundamental military skills, leadership, tactical operations, 
logistics operations, and staff responsibilities. The senior insti­
tutions dealt less with these day-to-day military concerns and more 
with concepts like strategy, defense management, and national security 
policy. On balance, the Senior Service Schools were established to 
prepare the most promising officers at mid-career for duty at the 
highest levels. Yet, each had its own reason for being.^
In a speech, August 20, 1906 at the U.S. Naval War College,
Stephen B. Luce said that institution was established "For an advanced 
course of professional study where officers could bring to the inves­
tigation of the various problems of naval warfare the scientific 
method adopted in other professions . . .  to raise naval warfare from the 
empirical stage to the dignity of a s c i e n c e . T h e  reasons for estab­
lishing the College were apparently clear to Luce in 1906 in contrast
Maureen My lander, "The War Colleges: A Wasted Resource," The 
Times Magazine. March 7, 1977, p. 7.
^United States Naval War College, History of the United States 
Naval War College: 1884-1958 (Washington: Naval Department Library,
Washington Naval Yard, Microfilm, MIC, lh, 1959) p. 1.
33
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to the first presentation of his draft proposal for a naval war col­
lege in November, 1882. John D. Hayes made a strong case of the lack
of clarity by Luce when he attempted to draw a distinction between a
3
war college and a line graduate school. Even the board of officers 
appointed by Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler to determine 
the feasibility of establishing such a college never made a clear
4
distinction between the two.
A review of the curriculum that Luce proposed for the school tend 
to support the contention by Hayes that Luce was not clear on the type 
post-graduate training he proposed. While the science of war, mili­
tary and naval history, military and international law, and modern 
languages would seem to be the type of studies in a curriculum appro­
priate for a high level post-graduate naval war academy; the inclusion 
of naval tactics, astronomy, hydrography, naval architecture, and 
marine engineering (subjects appropriate for a lower level naval 
operations and tactics course) would appear to make the school a 
staff college rather than a war academy. Yet, one must keep in
3
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings 
of the U.S. Naval War College," The Naval War College Review 23 (Jan­
uary, 1971): p. 52.
4
Luce prepared a draft general order on March 10, 1884 that 
would officially set up the Naval War College, and on May 3, 1884 
Secretary of the Navy Chandler appointed a board consisting of Luce, 
Commander William T. Sampson and Lieutenant Commander Casper F. 
Goodrich to report upon the whole subject of a post-graduate course 
for naval officers including the reason for establishing such a school, 
the scope and intent of the proposed course of instruction, and an 
opinion as to the best location for the school. For further details 
see Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and the Beginnings of The War College," 
pp. 53-54.
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mind that Luce had no model for the kind of institution he was pro­
posing. Surely there were war academies and staff colleges in 
Europe, but these were essentially army rather than naval schools. 
Additionally, although the United States had post-graduate schools 
at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, these also were army schools. 
There were no naval war colleges from which a model could be drawn. 
The United States Naval War College was to be unique. Not only was 
it to be the first armed services war college in the United States, 
it was recognized by many to be the first formally organized naval 
war college anywhere.^ It should then be no surprise that Luce 
turned to the most available source he had for a curriculum guide—  
the U.S. Army Schools at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth. However, 
while he adopted a curriculum similar to that at the Army’s schools, 
he nonetheless "fostered the assumption of a true war college status 
by emphasizing the study of national strategy as a combination of
g
sea and land power."
The three principal European staff colleges were the 
Kriegsakademie founded in Germany in 1810, the British Staff College 
opened in 1858 and France’s Ecole Suparieure de Guerre established in 
1878. The British Royal Naval College at Greenwich was also in 
existence; however, this school offered only technical courses which 
had no relation either to the process of fighting or to the princi­
ples of war. For additional information, see W. Royce Powell, "The 
United States Naval War College," Navy 2 (October, 1959)p. 37; also 
Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army; Edu­
cation, Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States 
Army 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1978), 
p. 11; and see Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R.I.: Naval 
War College Press, 1977), p. 38.
0
W. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," p. 37.
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One reason for the establishment of the Naval War College is
found in a letter written by Luce to Secretary of the Navy Richard
W. Thompson in August, 1877. As reported by Barnes, Kaufman, and
Gannon, Luce advocated in the letter "A school wherein our junior
officers would be carried through a post-graduate course consisting
of the higher branches of their profession. The leading features of
the post-graduate course was to be the carrying of the young officers
7
through a course of instruction in the art of war." This letter 
was written five years before Luce drafted the proposal for the 
establishment of a naval war college. Moreover, this letter revealed 
his real motivation for the establishment of a naval war college. He 
wanted the navy to have a post-graduate school similar to the Army’s 
Artillery School at Fort Monroe. He was inspired by what the Army 
was doing for the professional improvement of its officers, and felt
g
the Nayy could do the same. Luce was enthusiastic about his proposal
and prior to its final acceptance wrote to his son-in-law, Lieutenant
Boutelle Noyes in July, 1883:
My great hobby, now that the training system is 
fairly established, is to erect a "War School" 
for officers . . .  I have the plan roughly mapped 
out . . .  I have presented my plan to the Secretary 
but he has not had time to give the matter his 
attention. . . Whether it will end up in smoke or 
not I cannot say.^
Captain S. M. Barnes, Commander W. M. Kaufman and Commander 
H. T. Gannon, The United States Naval War College— A Staff Study of 
its Historical Background, Mission and Educational Philosophy: Prin­
ciples and Concepts from which the Second Year of the Course in Naval 
Warfare was Derived (Newport, R. I.: Naval War College, 1954), p. C-l.
Q
Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings of 
The U.S. Naval War College," p. 52.
^Ibid.
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According to Thomas B. Buell, Luce definitely knew the type of 
school he wanted. This would appear to refute charges made by Hayes 
that things were not clear in the mind of Luce. More importantly,
Luce realized that his proposal would not be popular within the navy, 
so in order to gain support he delivered a speech, to the Naval 
Institute on April 4, 1883. This speech on "War Schools" was really 
a tongue-in-cheek assessment of naval post-graduate education vis-a- 
vis the Army's training. Buell contends that Luce gave an impressive 
summary of the Army's advance warfare schooling in the speech and 
admonished his fellow naval officers that "The Army had been studying 
war while the Navy had been studying f o s s i l s . T h e r e f o r e ,  while 
there is some controversy over whether or not Luce knew exactly what 
type of naval post-graduate war academy he wanted, there is little 
doubt as to the major reason for its establishment; the traditional 
Army-Navy rivalry. The two services had been competitors for a long 
time. Neither wanted to be out-done by the other. Now that the Army 
had taken an early lead in the provision of post-graduate professional 
education, some in the Navy fretted and wanted to catch up. Army 
officials were just as determined to maintain its pre-eminence since 
that seryice was the first in America to establish post-graduate mili­
tary education although not at the senior level.
According to Timothy K. Nenninger, the need for post-graduate 
military education was obvious by the close of the nineteenth century. 
The experience in Europe and the demands of the military profession
■^Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Raymond A. 
Spruance and the Naval War College: Part I— Preparing for World War II," 
Naval War College Review 23 (March, 1971), pp. 32-33.
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in the United States required it. He argues that the question was no
longer academic but bureaucratic— when, how, and in what form would the
American A m y  undertake a systematic education of its regular officers 
11and men? Nenninger explains that it was important for the United
States Army at the time to have well-trained, professional officers to
cope with the technological, organizational, and tactical changes
occuring in warfare during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
12
centuries. One should note that by the end of the nineteenth cen­
tury, the idea that war could be carried on by amateurs became obso­
lete. Further, the earlier idea that war was in the province of the
13charismatic leader or the "Great Captain" genius was also rejected. 
Nenninger contends that even though one's experience and socio­
economic background as well as his place in the social organization 
of the profession had an effect on his professional development, edu­
cation was also needed. He says:
Professional education is also important because it 
affects the development of corporateness, responsibility 
and expertise. For the military profession schooling is 
particularly significant because of the limited oppor­
tunities officers have to practice their profession— to 
command and manage troops in combat. Other than war, 
school is among the principal means by which officers 
can develop professional expertise.^




Ronald Spector, Professors of War, p. 15. For a discussion of 
war in the nineteenth century see Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern 
World (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 143-194.
14
Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old 
Army, p . 6.
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Some senior Army officials had long recognized the need for profes­
sional training of their regular officers. They had studied the 
effects of professional training on their regular officers. They had 
studied the effects of professional schooling on officers in the 
armies of Russia and Germany. They saw how this type training 
improved the effectiveness of the European officers and they wanted 
to do the same for American Army officers. However, the situation in 
the United States was further complicated by a number of factors.
While the United States Army was headed by a Commanding General 
and there was a War Department staff, the commander did not always 
have the support of the staff officers. These bureau chiefs, accord­
ing to Pappas, regarded themselves as subject directly and only to 
the orders of the Secretary of War and not the Commanding General."^ 
Consequently, difficulties arose as to how the Army would be adminis­
tered and would function in the future. Emerging from this complex 
command and staff structure was the inability to fix the responsibility 
for the professional education of the regular army personnel. It was 
true that there were post-graduate schools operating at Fort Monroe 
and Fort Leavenworth, and that in 1866 the Engineer School at Willets 
Point, New York was established. However, the responsibility for the 
conduct of these schools and the determination of their curricula, 
fell to the individual arms and services concerned with the type 
training conducted at the schools. Pappas says "Little coordination 
and even less centralized control could be exercised under the exist-
■^George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri; The U.S. Army War College, 
1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: The Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1967), p. 5.
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16ing staff and command structure." Another complication was the fact 
that permanent assignment of officers to the various bureaus of the 
War Department caused these officers to become entrenched in the 
Washington scene. Therefore, they made their own contacts among the 
members of the Congress and the civilians of the executive branch, 
and as a result felt they had gained sufficient status to justify 
their providing advice directly to the Secretary of War rather than 
to The Commanding General.^ These complications caused anxiety 
among many senior officers and pointed up the need for a reorganiza­
tion of the Army before a system of professional military education 
at the higher levels could be instituted effectively.
It is therefore little wonder that Secretary of War Elihu Root
proposed a reorganization that included the creation of an interim
general staff and the establishment of an army war college to house
that staff. It was Root's intent that the head of each department of
the general staff and his assigned officers be detailed for limited
periods to the college not only to direct the instruction but also to
acquire the necessary experience in planning to enable them to provide
18
sound advice to the commander. This creation of an interim gene­
ral staff became the immediate cause for establishing the Army War 
College. However there were, according to Pappas, three concomitant 
purposes in establishing the College. These were "To further higher
Ibid., p . 6.
17T,. ,Ibid.
18Ibid., p. 13.
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instruction of Army personnel, to develop and organize existing means 
of education into a coherent and unified system, and to serve as a 
coordinating and authoritative agency through which all kinds of pro­
fessional military information would be available to the War Department 
19at any time." Even Pappas admits that functions assigned to The 
Army War College went far beyond that expected of an educational insti­
tution, and that it would appear "The initial concept primarily con­
cerned the function of The War College as a general staff rather than
20
as an education institution." Although the Congress in making appro­
priations supported Root in his determination to use The War College 
as the vehicle for an interim general staff, it was primarily through 
the efforts of Brigadier William H. Carter that the focus of the War
College was turned toward educational functions rather than its use
21as a general staff training ground. His constant lobbying with Root 
convinced him that a real educational institution was needed. As a 
result, an act authorizing the creation of a true general staff became 
effective in August, 1903 and Major General Samuel B. M. Young, who as 
the president of the first War College Board directed both the interim 
general staff and the College, became the first Chief of Staff of the 
Army. This enabled the War College to become a separate activity with 
Brigadier General Tasker Bliss as its first president. To him fell the 
task of making the Army War College not only the second Senior Service 
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The Army's leadership in promoting education as a means of pro­
viding a professional military force has already been detailed.
Although the establishment of its own War College as one of the pre­
miere military training institutions was preceded two decades by the 
Navy's War College, it nonetheless wasted little time in making the 
school a comparable institution. Additionally, the Army was quick to 
recognize inadequacies in its program and to call for corrective mea­
sures. Between the two world wars, education for and within the Army 
received far greater attention than ever before. This was a reflection
of both the emphasis placed on preparedness in peacetime and on the
22
increasing complexity of modern war. The need for a different type
high level institution— one to prepare personnel for advanced national
security management assignments became evident. The result was the
founding of the Industrial College of The Armed Forces (ICAF).
*
ICAF did not begin as a Senior Service School. It began as a
part of the Army. Known at first as the Army Industrial College, "It
was established in recognition of the high importance of logistical
23
training for the conduct of modern war." To understand this need,
one must understand the status of logistics in the A m y  through the
24
end of World War I. The matching of the means with the ends— the 
coordination of logistics with strategy— had been a continuous problem
Maurice Matloff, (ed.), American Military History (Washington: 
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), p. 409.
23tu - j  Ibid.
24
The Army's Chief of Military History defines logistics as "The 
art of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces... 
Logistics deals with the deployment of military forces and their equip­
ment to the area of war, and with innumerable services, such as feeding, 
clothing, supplying, transporting, and housing troops." For additional 
information see Maurice Matloff (ed.) American Military History, p. 12.
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for the Army since its beginning. Obtaining and delivering 
supplies and equipment to troops was often a hit and miss proposition 
from the colonial period through World War I. In spite of this, 
logistics continued to be revealed as important factors in determining 
where and when battles would be held. At times the supply system that 
was devised failed such as during the War of 1812. At other times 
prior detailed logistical planning and the judicious use of supplies 
and equipment insured victory as it did for Generals Grant and Sherman 
during the Civil War. However, there was no military school solely 
dedicated to teaching higher level logistical planning.
In this respect, the Army Industrial College became a pioneer
institution. Training in marshalling the nation's economic strength
25
and planning industrial mobilization became a reality. Having been 
closed during World War II by the War Department, pressure was exerted 
by senior Army officers in 1943 to reopen the College as the Army 
deyeloped demobilization plans. Although other Army officers suggested
sending personnel to the Harvard School of Business for industrial 
training, advocates for reopening the school prevailed and the Indus­
trial College was reopened; but not as an Army school. According to 
Hayden J. Price, it was reconstituted as a joint educational institu­
tion operating under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with 
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel serving as equal 
partners in the staff, faculty, and the student body. It was renamed
25
Hayden J. Price, "Student Diversity— ICAF's Unique Solution," 
Armed Forces Management 15 (March, 1969), p. 68.
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26
the Industrial College of The Armed Forces. The failure of indus­
trial preparedness during World War I had been the primary cause for 
the establishment of this institution.
Experiences of war helped both military and civilian leaders to 
realize the importance of educational preparation of armed service 
personnel for high level responsibilities. Moreover, wartime experi­
ences also tended to point to the need for studies in staff coordi-
27
nation and joint operations among the various military services.
It is to such experiences that one can trace the establishment of The 
National War College.
Early in World War II, American leaders became aware that the 
growing complexity of planning and conducting military operations at 
high levels demanded greatly increased training, as well as more
78
emphasis on joint operations and staff coordination." As a result,
in the Fall of 1942 General "Hap" Arnold recommended to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that an all service college be created to provide
training in joint planning and operations. The idea was to "train
officers of the arms in the exercise of command and performance of
29
staff duties in unified and coordinated Army and Navy Commands".
The establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) resulted in 
June, 1943. Reflecting a growing recognition of the inseparability
26t i . .Ibid.
27
John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and 
Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), p. 140.
28
The Rotunda: The Graduating Class of 1974 (Washington: The 
National War College, 1974), p. 10.
29
Ibid.
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of foreign policy and military policy, and thus the advisability of
combined training of both future military and civilian leaders who
would influence the planning and conduct of national security affairs,
Foreign Service Officers became students at ANSCOL along with indi-
30
viduals from the Army and Navy. The wartime success of this tempo­
rary institution helped to cause military and civilian leaders to call 
for the creation of a permanent post war joint service school. As 
usual in the military, a board of officers was created to study the 
suggestions.
In 1946, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow was appointed
President of the War Department Military Education Board. Commonly
known as the "Gerow Board", it was the final report by this group that
contained the first description of what was to become the permanent
31successor to ANSCOL— The National War College. The recommendations
of the Gerow Board contained a proposal that an education system be
established for officers of the Army consisting of a National Security
University, an Armed Forces Staff College, and schools and colleges
32operating under the supervision of Army Major Commands. It was the
intent of The Board that the National Security University consist of
an Administrative College, an Intelligence College, a National War
College, an Industrial College, and tentatively a State Department 
33
College.
31_, . j Ibid.
32
U.S. War Department, "Report of War Department Military Educa­
tion Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army," p. 10.
33
Ibid., p. 27. Also see George S. Stansfield's unpublished 
Chronology, "The National Defense University: Background-Army War Col­
lege and Industrial College," 1980, The National Defense University.
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The purpose of The National Security University as determined
by The Board, was to assure the development of officers capable of
high command and staff duties in connection with the prevention of
war, preparation for and prosecution of war on a global scale, and
the execution of responsibilities of the Armed Forces subsequent to 
34hostilities. It was stated in the Board report:
a. That there exists a requirement for a National 
War College to cover part of the instruction 
formerly included in the scope of the A m y  War 
College and the Army and Navy Staff College is 
indisputable. Instruction dealing with the 
operational aspects of field forces is included 
in the proposed Armed Forces Staff College.
b. World War I demonstrated the need for an 
Industrial College and this institution is 
now accepted as an essential part of our 
military educational system.
c. Experience in World War II established the need 
for more thorough training of officers in the 
handling of personnel and intelligence problems, 
particularly on the national and highest military 
level. The Administrative College and the 
Intelligence College are proposed to meet that
requirement.^
Even though a National Security University was not founded, two 
of the proposed colleges were established. The National War College 
and the Industrial College were founded along with the proposed sepa­
rate Armed Forces Staff College. The Board intended that The National 
War College be concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of 
the national resources to implement that strategy. In this connection,
34
Idem, "Report of War Department Military Education Board on 
Educational System for Officers of the Army," p. 27.
35Ibid., p. 28.
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the scope of instruction was to include the political, civil, logis­
tical and operational interests and responsibilities of The Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, The War, and Naval Departments. Within this scope, 
the Board intended that studies include: grand strategy and war
planning, foreign and domestic policies of all nations and their 
effect on world stability, causes and prevention of war, the economic 
and social resources of nations and their relationship to war potential, 
joint policies and joint doctrines, mobilization and demobilization, 
policies for operations with allies, trends of future wars and their
implications, and Armed Forces responsibilities after cessation of
36
active hostilities.
Looking back over the factors influencing the establishment of the 
various Senior Service Schools, it was found that experiences stemming 
from war was the foremost reason for founding the institutions. This 
was the case regarding the establishment after World War I of The 
Army Industrial College that later became The Industrial College of 
The Armed Forces. In like fashion experiences gained in World War II 
served to cause the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College that 
later evolved into The National War College. Yet, war experience was 
not the only cause for establishing Senior Service Schools. The Army's 
success with its post-graduate training and the need for like type 
training in the Navy appears to be the real reason for establishing 
the Naval War College. Secondary reasons for founding the Naval War 
College were the desire of Luce to provide a place where scientific 
method could be applied to problems of naval warfare, and a place where
"^Ibid., p. 29.
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officers could become professional through post-graduate studies.
While it seemed desirable to have a place where Army officers could 
gain professional training at the post-graduate level, this does not 
appear to be the main factor in the establishment of The Army War 
College, Rather, the need to reorganize the Army and to provide for 
a general staff served as the immediate cause for establishing that 
College. Other purposes for founding the Army War College included 
elements such as expansion of higher education for Army personnel, the 
development and organization of a united Army education system, and 
the provision of a coordinating and authoritative agency for the 
dissemination of military information.
Factors influencing the establishment of the Senior Service 
Schools provide one with ideological and practical reasons for the 
existences of the schools. Since the reasons for these schools were 
devised by individuals, it would be necessary to examine attitudes 
and influences held by the military and civilian leaders involved in 
order to understand the causes.
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CHAPTER IV
ROLES, ATTITUDES AND INFLUENCES OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE FORMATION
OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES
Senior service education has not always been popular. Most of
the senior schools had just as many enemies as friends during their
formative years, and the support they did receive from many military
and civilian leaders was often lukewarm at best.^" The military had
been particularly affected by a syndrome that Professor Philip A.
Crowl and Ronald Spector refer to as "technicism." According to
Spector, technicism was the tendency among some officers to emphasize
training in technical skills at the expense of general military know- 
2
ledge. Crowl contends that Stephen B. Luce was an early leader in 
the fight against technicism. Arguing that a naval officer should 
cease to be exclusively a navigator, a seaman, a gunner, or an engi­
neer and become a professional in the art and science of war, Luce was 
thrust into the forefront of the military educational revolution of
the 1880's and 1890's "that was to propel the armed services of the
3
United States out of what has rightly been called the dark ages."
■*"John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldier and Scho­
lars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), p. 142.
2
Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R. I.: Naval War
College Press, 1977), p. 10.
3
Philip A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War 
College: 1884-1972," Naval War College Review 26 (November-December,
1973), p. 4.
49
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In spite of the efforts of men like Luce, Emory Upton, Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, Tasker Bliss and Elihu Root, this military intellectual revolu­
tion did not come easy. Old animosities against post-graduate educa­
tion of military officers and the desire by many to maintain techni­
cism as a basis for military professional development were strong and
4
not easy to overcome. Infusion of these old prejudices into the 
early development of the Naval War College is a case in point.
According to Crowl, "During the first two decades the mere 
existence of a [Naval] War College seemed to provoke only two reactions 
among most naval officers and Washington politicians: one, indiffe­
rence; two, outright hostility, and of these, the second was predomi­
nant."^ Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell appears to agree with 
Crowl. Buell said:
The Navy response [to the proposal for a Naval War 
College] was indifference and hostile. But Luce pre­
vailed and the Naval War College was established. . . It 
had many enemies and few friends.6
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes also points out the attitude held by many
concerning the Naval War College. Hayes contends that Secretary of
the Navy Richard W. Thompson to whom Luce first submitted a proposal
for a naval war college never acknowledged receipt of the letters
from Luce. He further argues that "It is something of a paradox that
William E. Chandler [Thompson's successor] whose ideas on the purpose
of a nayy left much to be desired and who had no interest in foreign
4
Ronald Spector, Professors of War, p. 3 and p. 10.
'’ibid., p. 3.
Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Raymond A. 
Spruance and the Naval War College: Part I-Preparing for World War II," 
Naval War College Review 23 (March, 1971), p. 33.
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affairs should have initiated the pioneer endeavor in higher military 
education."^ At the beginning of the discussions to establish a col­
lege, Secretary William C. Whitney, who succeeded Chandler, had a 
neutral attitude toward the college. At the same time Whitney was 
aware that the notion of the college was unpopular. The position of 
neutrality held by Whitney later changed to indifference and finally
g
antagonism because of misunderstandings with Luce. Crowl said Secre­
tary Whitney developed such an intense personal dislike of Luce that 
he had the Naval War College moved from its original site at Coasters
Harbor Island where it had functioned under the Bureau of Navigation
9
to Goat Island to be consolidated with the Torpedo School. The col­
lege had been housed from its beginning in a former almshouse on 
Coasters Harbor Island; and according to Crowl when Luce first saw 
it he was moved to say "Poor little house, I christen thee the United 
States Naval War College . . . .  In the name of the Father and of the 
Son, and of the Holy G h o s t . H a y e s  said this invocation of the 
Trinity was given while Luce made the sign of the cross and it caused 
some naval wits in Washington to dub the new institution "Trinity 
College. When the Naval War College was consolidated with the
^Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings




Philip A. Crowl, "Education versus Training at the Naval War 
College: 1884-1972," p. 3.
^8Ibid., p. 1.
"^Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings 
of the U.S. Naval War College," p. 56.
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Torpedo School on Goat Island in 1889 Whitney nearly accomplished his 
aim which was the end of the college. The school did however survive 
because of efforts by Luce and Mahan to save it and was moved back to 
Coasters Island in 1892 where it was housed in a new building named 
Luce Hall.^
Not only was the Naval War College plagued with indifference 
and hostility by some secretaries of the Navy, it was also attacked by 
many politicians. One of the few politicians to befriend the Naval 
War College and to promote its establishment was Senator Nelson W. 
Aldridge of Providence, Rhode Island. Hayes said of him: "In an 
attempt to gain congressional recognition [for the College.], Aldridge 
on 4 Feburary introduced a resolution in the Senate requiring the 
Secretary of the Navy to report the steps that had been taken to 
establish an advanced course of instruction for naval officers and the 
reasons which suggested such an action. In his answer Chandler
13repeated the arguments that Luce had originally presented to him." 
According to Hayes, support in the House of Representatives was not 
nearly so favorable. Representative Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama, 
Chairman of The House Naval Committee, was an early opponent of the 
Naval War College. Luce testified before The House Naval Committee 
as part of an attempt to gain appropriations for the College. However 
when the bill for naval appropriations came before the House in June 
1886, Herbert left no doubt as to his attitude about the Naval War
12
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College when he said: "Now is the proper time to consider carefully
whether or not that college is to become a permanent institution. In
14
the opinion of a large majority of your committee, it ought not."
Crowl report that further criticism came from Congressman William
McAdoo of New Jersey who said:
The idle rich in their sumptuous mansions on Bellevue 
Avenue [in Newport, R.I.J would surely corrupt the young 
naval officers sent to Newport for study and professional 
training. It was "a great misfortune," he said, "that 
our military schools should be established in connection 
with watering places characterized in certain seasons of 
the year as scenes of social display and d i s s i p a t i o n . ^
Perhaps the most dramatic attack on the college was that by
Hilary A. Herbert after he had left Congress and became Secretary of
the Navy (.1893-1897) during the second term of President Cleveland.
Crowl writes that Herbert had decided to abolish the Naval War College
altogether as an economy measure. However, it was saved at the last
minute in 1893 when Herbert, on his way to Newport, Rhode Island, was
loaned a copy of Alfred Thayer Mahan's book The Influences of Seapower
on the French Revolution and Empire. After reading it, he was converted
into a lifelong friend of the College.
Mahan was a devotee of the college from the very beginning when
he was appointed the first Professor of Naval History. Crowl, in
writing about Mahan, says:
14Ibid., p. 58.
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Mahan . . .believed that from the study of naval history 
would emerge certain principles of maritime strategy, 
certain permanent truths as equally applicable today 
as yesterday and tomorrow as today. And in exploring 
history and demonstrating these truths at the Naval 
War College, Mahan hoped and expected that the 
institution would become a true nursery of maritime 
strategists and naval statesman.
The desire of Mahan and Luce for a successful war college was not
shared by all naval officers. There were some technicists who could
see little value in studying strategy and policy or the campaigns of
famous military leaders, or even the maritime strategy of other coun- 
18
tries. Early in his quest for support for a war college, Luce wrote
to many influential fellow officers who were in a position to influence
retention of the Naval War College. One of them, Captain Francis M.
Ramsey was the Superintendent of The Naval Academy and a technicist
who disapproved of the College and who saw no reason for establishing
another Naval Academy. He wrote Luce in 1884: "My view, in regard to
this matter differs materially from those expressed by you in your
19article published in the Proceedings of The Naval Institute." Also, 
there were some officers assigned to the Naval Training Station at 
Newport, Rhode Island who disliked the College for no other reason 
than they coveted the building and grounds for their own purposes.
They felt that the College's facilities were more permanent and com­
fortable than their own headquarters. Fortunately for Luce, the 
officers with attitudes such as those just described did not prevail. 
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Goodrich, Luce was able to get the Naval War College started. Sampson,
an educator who succeeded Ramsey as Superintendent of The Naval Academy,
shared the views of Luce regarding the need for post-graduate education
for Naval officers; and Goodrich, an admirer of Sampson, also believed
in the idea. Their support becomes more significant when one considers
the fact that it was these two who along with Luce comprised the board
which reviewed the merits of such an institution and who recommended
20
its establishment by the Navy.
Finally, many students were hostile to the Naval War College.
Crowl points out: "Most of the first class of eight officers who had
heen sent from the Torpedo School at Goat Island, felt that they had
been shanghaied. To almost all the early students, the curriculum at
21
the War College seemed irrelevant to the point of absurdity." Crowl
continues by saying that "Eyen as late as 1911 William S. Sims, later
to become President of the War College, was most reluctant to be
22assigned as a student."
Probably more than anyone else except Luce, Mahan should be 
given credit for helping to change attitudes held by military personel 
and civilian leaders. As the second president of the institution, he 
went about explaining its reason for existence and showing that the 
school would neither duplicate nor compete with the post-graduate 
school at Annapolis. In the final analysis, Mahan won over many 
technicists. He argued: "The navy had many hardware experts, but none
20
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23were authorities on the Art of War." Having seen the roles, atti­
tude and influences of individuals instrumental in the establishment 
of the Naval War College, attention can now be turned to the Army War 
College.
Early attitudes in the Army concerning post-graduate education 
were a little different than that in the Navy when that service's war 
college was founded. The Army had benefit of the long establishment 
of its schools at Port Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, and a number of 
senior Army officers had traveled to Europe after Emory Upton's trip 
primarily to inspect German training establishments. Consequently, 
much literature was published concerning post-graduate education in 
the Army. The foremost book on the subject was Upton's The Armies of 
Asia and Europe as previously indicated. However, there were other 
significant early writings, and according to George S. Pappas: "Almost 
without exception these writings included a recommendation for estab­
lishment of a war academy, a war college, or some other form of post-
24
graduate schooling for officers." Among these writings were: a 
pamphlet written by Brigadier General Thomas M. Vincent in 1870 
entitled "Plea for the Staff of the Army of The United States"; an 
essay by Lieutenant Arthur L. Wagner on "An American College" which 
appeared in the 1889 edition of The Journal of The Military Service 
Institution; Captain E. L. Zalinski's essay "Army Organization, The
23
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Best Adopted to a Republican Form of Government, Which Will Ensure an
Effective Peace" appearing in the same journal; Captain T. A. Bingham's
essay "The Prussian Great General Staff and What It Contains That Is
Practical from an American Standpoint"; and finally Major Theodore
25
Schwan's 1894 book Report on the Organization of the German Army.
While these and other writings created a positive attitude for the 
establishment of some type of post-graduate education, the titles 
suggest that the calls for such training were tied either to a reor­
ganization of the Army or the creation of a General Staff. It was 
this "marriage of convenience" that contributed to differing roles, 
attitudes and influences of individuals in the development of the Army 
War College.
One of the earliest supporters of military education in the Army
was Henry W. Halleck who served as Commanding General of the Army
during The Civil War period. According to Pappas, Halleck during the
period 1840-1849 emphasized that the principles of military art and
science constituted the body of a profession and that it made no
sense to entrust the professional duties of a military officer to a
civilian. Accordingly, Halleck contended that it was necessary to
have military officers devoted to the cultivation of military science
so.as to be able to compete with individuals overseas who were already
schooled in military science. Halleck saw the teaching of military
science not only as a means of educating the military officer, but
also as a means of insuring the preparedness of the military; thus
26military science becomes a means of insuring peace. While Halleck
Ibxd.
26t,Ibid., p. 7.
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did not speak directly of the necessity for post-graduate education, 
his Elements of Military Art and Science served as an inspiration to 
Emory Upton who after his trip to Europe and Asia argued for such 
advanced training of Army officers.
The ideas expressed by Upton regarding post-graduate training
greatly influenced Major General William H. Carter who as a young
officer in the Adjutant General Department became a confidant of
Secretary of the War Elihu Root and subsequently persuaded him of the
need for an Army War College. Like Chandler of the Navy, Root appointed
a board of officers consisting of Carter (who was then a Lieutenant
Colonel), Brigadier General William Ludlow, Colonel Henry C. Hasbrouck,
and Colonel Joseph P. Snager (who accompanied Upton on his around-the-
world trip) for the purpose of "considering regulations with a view to
27establishment of a War College for the Army."
This board, commonly referred to as the Ludlow Board, was faced 
with the task of studying the feasibility of a true War College in 
face of strong pressure from some senior army officers for the organi­
zation of a General Staff as the primary need of the Army with a War 
College secondary. Even the fact that Root was successful in obtain­
ing a congressional appropriation of $20,000 for the establishment of 
a war college before the Ludlow Board had completed its work did not 
quiet the strong sentiment for establishment of a General Staff. The 
members of the Ludlow Board were not able to overcome the opposition 
for a separate War College, and in its recommendations provided Root
“^ Ibid., p. 14.
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with the means for establishing a War College to function as a Gene­
ral Staff, although the Board indicated there should be a separate 
war college at the first opportunity. Pappas contends that there is 
little doubt that Root's own concept and General Ludlow's influence
28
on the Board's deliberations resulted in the final recommendations.
Carter, however, continued at every opportunity to press for a sepa­
rate General Staff and a separate War College. Even as a member of 
the Board appointed by Root to organize and operate the War College,
Carter continued to insist that the college should be separated from
29
the General Staff. In spite of opposition from many senior A m y  
officers and members of Congress, Carter's efforts were realized in 
February 1903 when a campaign waged by Root ended in the passage of 
"An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Amy", which set up a sepa­
rate General Staff thus freeing the War College to become a true 
educational institution.
When the War College Board was dissolved, General Tasker Bliss
became President of the War College with Colonel Alexander Mackenzie
30and Major William D. Beach as directors. These three began the job
28Ibid., pp. 19-20.
29
Root appointed a board of officers to convene not later than 
July, 1902 to organize the War College. Serving on this War College 
Board were: Major General Samuel B. M. Young, President; Brigadier 
General Carter; Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss; Major Henry A. Green; 
and Major William D. Beach. Added as ex officio members were The Chief 
of Engineers, The Chief of Artillery, The Commandant of The General 
Service and Staff College, and The Superintendent of The Military Academy.
30
Neither General Young or General Carter who were the principals 
in the establishment of a separate General Staff and a separate War Col­
lege continued to serve the college after it became separate. As previous­
ly indicated, General Young was appointed the first Chief of Staff of the 
A m y  and General Carter was sent to duty in the Philippines.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
of making the Army War College a part of the Army educational system.
Bliss introduced at the College his learn-by-doing method in which
lectures were given to the students and then they executed what they
31had learned as part of a "great war game." Bliss also fostered
improved relations with The Naval War Academy. Under his leadership,
The College participated in the preparation of operational studies and
plans as requested by the Chief of Staff, the planning and conduct of
maneuvers and exercises, and supervised the Army's educational system
including military instruction conducted at civilian colleges and uni-
32
versities under the Morrill Act of 1862. In 1906, General Bliss was
assigned to duty in the Philippines. Because there was no general
officer immediately available to replace him Lieutenant Colonel William
H. Wotherspoon became the Acting President with the consent of The Chief 
33of Staff. Wotherspoon was ultimately replaced by Brigadier General 
Thomas H. Berry whereupon he assumed the position of a director along 
with Lieutenant Colonel Smith S. Leach. Perhaps the most significant 
undertaking during the period of their service was closer cooperation 
with the Naval War College in planning amphibious type operations 
which benefited both services in organizing the expeditionary force 
sent to Cuba in 1906. This was an early example of Army-Navy coopera-
31Ibid., p. 35.
32
The Morrill Act of 1862 provided for military instruction in 
landgrant colleges. The number of instructors providing courses in 
military science and tactics at these civilian institutions increased 
over the years and became the basis for later organizing the Reserve 
Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The ROTC was officially established 
by the National Defense Act of 1916. For additional information see 
Maurice Matloff (ed.), American Military History (Washington: Office 
of The Chief of Military History, 1969), p. 290 and p. 367.
33Pappas, Prudens Futuri, p. 48.
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tion and was a prelude to joint services education.
The Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) was the culmination of 
efforts by many to establish joint service training. In the forefront 
was Lieutenant General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold who forwarded a memorandum 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggesting the creation of ANSCOL. It 
is alleged that the memorandum was actually prepared by two of Hap
Arnold’s assistants; Lieutenant Colonel Cabell and Lieutenant Colonel
34Smart. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was brought back from duty
in the Aleutian Island Campaign (during World War II) to become its 
35first commandant. General DeWitt had been Commandant of The Army 
War College from 1937 to 1939. Commodore Foy became the Deputy Comman­
dant. Foy was a former Navy faculty representative at the Army War 
36College. General DeWitt was not long on duty station before talk
began concerning the need for a permanent postwar institution to
replace ANSCOL. Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill succeeeded General DeWitt
as. Commandant. It was during Admiral Hill’s term that "prominent
officials —  including Secretaries of War Henry L. Stimson and James
V. Forrestal —  concerned themselves with the creation of permanent
37postwar joint service schools." Prominent military personnel who 
joined in this call for a permanent joint staff college included
3 4
George S. Stansfield’s unpublished Chronology, "The National 
Defense University: Background-Army War College and Industrial College," 
(The National Defense University, 1980), p. 8.
35The Rotunda: The Graduating Class of 1974 (Washington: The 
National War College, 1974), p. 10.
3 6
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Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's personal representa­
tive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, the
Chief of Naval Operations and General George C. Marshall, wartime
38
Army Chief of Staff. However, at the beginning the support by 
these prominent individuals did not foreshadow the type of permanent 
joint army-navy staff institution that would finally emerge. That 
can be clearly seen in a review of the controversy surrounding the 
selection of a name for the permanent institution.
As early as October, 1945 and prior to his departure as Comman­
dant of ANSCOL, General DeWitt wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that 
it was desirable to settle on an appropriate title for the postwar 
joint college. General DeWitt said: "The name of the present college 
has not fully described its mission, which was to increase the effi­
ciency of officers ordered to command as well as staff assignments in 
unified or coordinated Army and Navy commands. The title Staff College 
led to the conclusion that its only function was that of training 
officers for staff duty, and is reported to have resulted in a reluc­
tance on the part of some officers to accept assignment to it as 
39students." DeWitt continued by explaining various titles containing 
the phrase "War College" had been considered but were not found accep­
table because of probable confusion with the Army War College and with
90
Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 185/3, 10 April 1943, Modern Mili­
tary Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of 
the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 1, Box 
241). The National Archives. It should be noted that the combined 
Chiefs of Staff (.CCS) was a World War II committee consisting of the 
professional Chiefs of America and England responsible to the President 
and Prime Minister for planning and directing the grand strategy of 
the coalition. Its American members were Marshall, King, Lehey, and 
Hap Arnold. For further information see Maurice Matloff (ed.), Ameri­
can Military History, pp. 427-428.
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the Naval War College. He suggested that in order to describe more 
accurately the functions of the postwar college, to assign a more dis­
tinctive designation, to lend more dignity to the title, and to in­
crease its appeal to the public the successor to ANSCOL should he
titled "The College of National Defense" and it should become effective
41
upon completion of ANSCOL's final war-time course on December 8, 1945. 
Admiral King agreed that the name of ANSCOL would not fully describe 
the mission of a permanent successor; however, he disagreed with Gene­
ral DeWitt's proposal. He indicated that the title "The College of 
National Defense" appeared to be too inclusive, and with such a name it 
would b.e difficult to judge from it anything as to the nature of the 
school." Accordingly, Admiral King suggested "As the eventual scope 
and curriculum of the Army-Navy Staff College will depend in some 
measure on the post war organization of the armed forces, it is con­
sidered that, in the interim, the present title is adequately descrip­
tive . . . The title Army and Navy Staff and Command College (ANSCOL) 
would seem fully descriptive and is suggested, if any change is con­
sidered necessary.
39
Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper, 962/11, 5 October 1945, ANSCOL 
Memorandum, Subject: "Army and Navy Staff College: Proposed Name for 
Post-War Successor," Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Divi­
sion, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Chiefs of Staff 
(CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72), The National Archives.
41
JCS Paper 962/13, CNO Memorandum, 22 October 1954, Subject: 
"Proposed Name for The Post-War Army and Navy Staff College," Modern 
Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records 
of The United States Chiefs of Staff ('CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4,
Box 72), The National Archives.
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General Hap Arnold also became concerned over a proper name for
the post-war college and suggested the name of ANSCOL be changed to
"College of National Security". He wrote:
Public opinion and the attitude of the services, 
particularly in so far as education within the 
services is concerned, are affected by the titles 
of our military schools and establishments. The 
United States is committing itself to maintain 
armed services of sufficient size and strength 
to maintain national security and fulfill certain 
international commitments. This goes beyond 
national defense. It can more appropriately be ^  
described under the heading "national security."
The controversy continued after the departure of General DeWitt and 
his replacement by Admiral Hill. A record of a telephone conversation 
between Major General Alfred Grunther of the Army (who later became one 
of the Deputy Commandants of The National War College along with 
Admiral Foy and Brigadier General Landon of the Air Force) and Major 
General McFarland on the staff of The Joint Chiefs of Staff disclosed 
that Admiral Hill was concerned that the delay regarding the selection 
of a name might prejudice public opinion; particularly, if the State 
Department agreed to participate in the post-war college, and if a 
press release was given to the newspapers with a name omitted. Gene­
ral Grunther indicated that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of 
Staff of the Army, had talked with General Carl Spaatz, and Admiral 
Hill had talked with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and all were ready to 
select a name from a final list of three which included: National War 
College, National Defense College, National Security College. It 
appeared however that Admiral Leahy was the only individual that was
42
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not prepared to select a final name. General Grunther also suggested
that it may come down to the participants flipping a coin for the name,
and finally indicated that if a name wasn't selected soon Drew Pearson
43
or Senator Thomas would hear of it and embarass everyone.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 1, 1946 finally decided on
a name and agreed to change ANSCOL to The College of National Security;
however, this was rescinded on February 4, 1946 in a memorandum from
Captain C.J. Moore, Deputy Secretary of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
Admiral Hill. So, the controversy continued. Credit for breaking this
long stalemate should go to Admiral Hill who attended a conference with
The Secretary of War where the name "National War College" was suggested.
Hill obtained the concurrences for this change from General Eisenhower,
General Spaatz, Admiral Nimitz, Secretary Forrestal and Mr. Russell
(an assistant Secretary of State). James Byrne the Secretary of State
later confirmed Mr. Russell's concurrence. Accordingly, on April 4,
1946 the War Department announced to its major subordinate commands the
establishment of the National War College for Army, Navy and State
Department officers, and that the college would be the highest level
44
education institution of the Armed Forces.
The individuals whose attitudes, roles and influences were instru­
mental in the founding of the primary Senior Service Schools were both
Record of telephone conversation between General Alfred Grunther 
and General McFarland, 1 February 1946, JCS Papers, Modern Military 
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the 
United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72),
The National Archives.
44War Department Letter, Office of The Adjutant General, 4 April 
1946, Subject: "National War College," JCS Papers, Modern Military
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the 
United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72),
The National Archives.
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military and civilian leaders. In the case of The Naval War College 
which endured twenty-five years of indifference and hostility on the 
part of Secretaries of The Navy, Congressmen, some senior naval offi­
cers and even some students who wanted to continue with technicism as 
the basis for training naval officers, it took all the persistence 
that supporters of the College could muster to save it from extinction. 
Stephen Luce, Senator Nelson W. Aldridge, William T. Sampson and Casper 
F. Goodrich and even Hilary A. Herbert are but a few of the individuals 
who labored to save the Naval War College. However, if one person 
should be given credit for doing most to insure the survival of the 
College, that individual would be Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Army leaders were no less confronted with animosities against the 
Army War College than individuals in the Navy had been against its 
College. The Army leaders fight was not against prejudices and techni­
cism as in the Navy. Rather, their fight was against those who saw the 
Army War College as an adjunct, and even a subsidiary, of a General 
Staff. General William H. Carter is to be given credit for convincing 
Secretary of War Elihu Root to separate the General Staff and the Army 
War College. Addititionally, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, Lieutenant 
Colonel William H. Wotherspoon and Brigadier Thomas Berry, all of whom 
served as Presidents of the College should be credited for making the 
Army War College a true educational institution.
Lieutenant General Henry "Hap" Arnold was the driving force be­
hind The Army-Navy Staff College while Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt 
and Vice Admiral Henry W. Hill, as commandants, made ANSCOL a func­
tioning reality. However, DeWitt became a leading figure, along with 
most of the outstanding and well-known military leaders of the period, 
in a controversy over the selection of a name for the permanent
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successor to ANSCOL because Army-Navy Staff College did not fit the 
mission or image for the post-war institution. Admiral Hill finally 
got everyone to agree on the title "National War College" and that 
Senior Service School was finally established as the highest level 
military educational institution of The Armed Services.
As things turned out, The National War College did not in fact 
become the highest level educational institution among the services. 
Rather, it had to compete with the individual services own war col­
leges and with the Industrial College of The Armed Forces because of 
the attitudes and influences of both military and civilian supporters 
and opponents of all the institutions. This point becomes more clear 
when one examines curricular development of the Senior Service Schools. 
Chapter V will attempt to show the similarities and differences among 
those schools by taking a critical look at the curriculum development 
and instructional methodologies of each. Special emphasis will be 
given to the development of curriculum and instructional strategies of 
the National War College.
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CHAPTER V
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT AND INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES
The curriculum of an institution tends to distinguish if from 
other institutions and gives it a clear identity among its peers. More 
importantly, the curriculum is often a factor in attracting students to 
the academy. Alan 0. Pfnister argues further that curriculum is the 
critical key to greater retention of students who elect to attend a col­
lege or university.^ It follows that curriculum is important to the 
growth and development of an institution of higher learning whether its 
orientation be military or civilian. Military Senior Service Schools, 
unlike civilian colleges and universities, have not had to compete for 
students nor to worry about their retention. The military system en­
sures the ready availability of student clientele whereas civilian insti­
tutions have not enjoyed such an advantage. This difference between the 
two sectors, military and civilian, in attaining and retaining students 
does not reduce the importance of curriculum development or instruc­
tional strategies at the military schools vis-a-vis civilian colleges 
and universities. In fact, curriculum development at the various War 
Colleges in the United States became a critical element in the growth
of each War College, and tended to give to each its own character
2
thus clearly distinguishing one from the other.
^Alan 0. Pfnister, Planning for Higher Education (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), p. 175.
2
John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: 
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957), p. 342.
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Masland and Radway looked at the curriculum at the Senior Service 
military schools and determined that it was the breadth of the curri­
culum at each that made it different from its peers and unique in 
higher education. Their findings support the contention that at no 
other institution of higher learning can an individual receive instruc­
tion on the full range of factors, considerations and circumstances 
that bear upon their studies as one can obtain at the military Senior 
Service Schools. The question arises as to how and why the curriculum 
at the various Senior Service Colleges developed as they did. Also 
what are distinguishing features of each? To answer these question one 
must begin before the United States military higher educational insti­
tutions were founded.
At the time the United States military schools were established, 
curricula for the proper teaching of military science and tactics had 
been developed and were in use in European military schools. In fact, 
when General Emory Upton visited the military schools of the great 
powers of Europe and Asia, he found a diverse curricula which not only 
appeared to prepare the young students for a life in the military forces 
of their countries, but also helped to prepare them for the cultural 
and social life among their people. Military schools at Modena and 
Turin in Italy are good examples of training gounds for their culture. 
Students attending those schools were expected not only to become pro­
ficient in military subjects such as military history and geography,
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fortifications, military law and administration, and the study of arms, 
but they were required to become proficient also in engineering during 
their three year course. Therefore, the students had to master sub­
jects such as arithmetic, plane geometry, elements of physics, chemistry, 
minerology, mechanical drawing and topography as well as purely military 
subjects. Additionally, the military trainee had to learn Greek and 
Roman history, the Italian and French languages, literature of Italy
and France, and they had to become proficient-in writing. The same
3
type of studies were required at the Russian military schools.
Upton also observed that before a student could be admitted to
the Nicholas Staff Academy at St. Petersburg, he would have had to
complete an educational level that is comparable to the secondary*
school in the United States. More important he would have to pass
competitive examinations in mathematics, plane trigonometry, history,
geography, fortifications, tactics, the theory of arms, the Russian
language, and either the French or German languages. Once admitted,
the student would spend three years studying what the Russians referred
to as principal and secondary subjects. Principal subjects included
tactics and strategy, military history, military administration,
military statistics, geodesy, cartography and topographic drawing. The
secondary subjects included world history, international law, riding,
4
Russian, French or German, artillery and fortifications.
3
Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official
Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, 
Austria, Germany, France and England (N.Y.: Appleton & Co., 1878)
pp. 131-133.
^Ibid., pp. 152-153.
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The same procedures as practiced in Russia generally held in the 
war schools of other European countries. Competitive•examinations in 
Austria contained more mathematics and science requirements than in 
Russia, and its two year course of study included studies of the politi­
cal economy, the history of civilization, and the natural sciences."*
The competitive examination requirements at the Staff College at 
Sandhurst, England were very similar to that in Austria except the 
British candidate had to pass elementary mechanics, the Hindustani 
language as well as French and German, and geology. The British two 
year course was divided into obligatory military subjects and voluntary 
subjects such as additional languages, experimental sciences and photo­
graphy.^ The French Academy of War was in the process of being 
organized when Upton made his tour; it, therefore, was not open during 
his visit in France. However, its curriculum was already under develop­
ment, and was patterned after that of the famous War Academy of Berlin.^
Candidates for the Berlin War Academy not only had to pass a com­
petitive examination in various military, scientific, and social studies, 
but also had to select and write on a theme from a predetermined list 
in order to show his literary and scientific mastery. Also, he had to 
submit a written theme, much in the form of a case study, in which he 
discussed the movement and disposition of troops in certain offensive 
and defensive operations. When admitted to the War Academic, the German 
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Unlike the other European schools which relied mostly on the lecture 
method of instruction, the Berlin War Academy added the disputation 
method and used it widely. Instructional strategies at the German 
academy were different from the rest of the European war schools in that 
its main emphasis was not only on acquiring positive knowledge, but also 
on the habit of developing critical thinking among its students so as to 
ensure action from insight rather than from impuse. It should be noted 
that another departure from other European War Schools was the teaching 
of General Staff duties as required study, inclusion of experimental 
philosophy, ancient history, history of the Middle Ages, and the history
g
of literature as electives. Many of the innovations in the Berlin War 
Academy mirrored similar new methods in the country's civilian institu­
tions. These innovations were significant to many Americans who
visited Germany and who brought back reports on the German ideas of
9
academic freedom and advanced scholarship in the universities.
Just as American civilian educators brought back innovative ideas for 
educating civilians, so did the military visitors such as Upton, for 
furthering military higher education. On the basis of these reports 
the United States Senior Service Colleges developed their curricula.
8Ibid., p. 216-127.
9
George Ticknor, Edward Everette and Joseph Green Cogswell were 
among the very first Americans to study at the German University.
Their visit was during the 1815-1817 time frame and opened the way for 
more American educators, both from civilian and military institutions, 
to make the trip overseas to study new German methods in higher educa­
tion. For additional information see Richard Hofstadter and Wilson 
Smith, American Higher Education; A Documentary History, 2 vol. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 1: 257-263.
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The U. S. Naval War College, the first War College to be established, 
became the first such activity to use the German methods.
From the beginning of the Naval War College, emphasis was placed
on fundamentals and principles, on stimulating logical thought pro­
cesses, and on the study of war as a serious art. W. Royce Powell con­
tends that it was on these solid intellectual bases that the curriculum 
of the Naval War College was developed and has helped to maintain the 
continuation of the course offerings."^ However, it is ironic that 
while the Naval War College curriculum and methods of instruction 
reflected that of the Berlin War Academy, it was after observation of 
the curricula at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth that a course of 
study was adopted by the Naval War College. Could it be possible that 
this action reflects the rivalry between the services?
The initial curriculum of the Navy War College was, therefore,
adopted by its founder, Admiral Luce, from that of the Army schools
previously mentioned. In their programs of study strategy, history and
11international law were taught along with studies in military tactics. 
However, Luce departed from the curriculum devised by the Army by 
placing emphasis on the study of national strategy as an outgrowth of 
a combination of sea and land power. His premise was that in studying 
the art of war, one must realize that national strategy is derived from 
national power, and this power is achieved by strength in both land and 
sea operations. Thus, from its very beginning, the modern concept of
■^W. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," Navy, 
2 (Oct. 1959), 10: 37.
Ibid.
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joint operations became the fundamental basis for the Naval War
12
College curriculum.
The Naval War College's first curriculum in the winter of 1885
was very limited and consisted of six weeks of lectures and discussions.
Unlike the German method, papers were not originally required of the
officers in attendance, and such work as done by them was entirely
voluntary except perhaps attendance at lectures. As indicated in
ChapterII, the works of Alfred Thayer Mahon on sea power formed the
core of the naval instruction, and the lectures of Lieutenant Tasker H.
Bliss on tactics and Professor James Russell Sorley on international
13law provided related subjects. In the summer of 1886, lectures in
naval history, costal defense and tactical exercises with steam launches
14were added to the course of study.
War gaming"^ was introduced in the Naval War College's curriculum 
in 1892 after a series of lectures by Captain William McCarty Little,
13
Alfred Thayer Mahan's works on the influence of sea power upon 
history were written between 1890 and 1905 and are considered some of 
the world's most influential military treaties. They contain theories 
of sea operations that were taught to the early Naval War College 
students. For an excellent rendering of Mahan's theories see Alfred 
Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 7-251. This
edition combines an abridgement of The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
History 1660-1783 with excerpts from The Influence of Sea Power Upon 
the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812. It has approximately 400 
illustrations of which 200 are in color.
14
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight and Lieutenant William D. Puleston, 
History of The United States Naval War Colleges, (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, 1916), p. 8.
^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines war gaming as the act 
of studying and testing military concepts through simulated battles or 
campaigns conducted in conferences by officers acting as opposing staffs. 
See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (1977), s.v. "War Game."
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16one of the staunchest advocate of this method of instruction. "The 
modern war game had been invented by Lieutenant von Reisswitz of the 
Prussian Guard Artillery in 1824, and by the time of Bismarck and von 
Moltke [Chancellor of Germany and Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army 
respectively who are credited with modernizing the German Armed Forces] 
it was in general use throughout the Prussian Army."^ However, the 
naval war game as instituted by the U. S'. Naval War College was not the 
same as that suggested by von Reisswitz. Rather, the kind of games 
advocated by Captain Little that finally were established as part of the 
College curriculum had been developed in 1878 by Captain Philip H. Colomb 
of The Royal British Navy. The Colomb method consisted of three kinds 
of games: "The Duel" which simulated battle between two ships; "The
Tactical Game" which was a simulated maneuver involving two opposing 
fleets of battleships and cruisers; and "The Strategic Game" which in-
18
volved large battle over great ocean distances between opposing fleets. 
Under the war gaming concept used at the Naval War College, a "main 
problem" was assigned to the class for resolution. Officers were 
grouped in committees for studying the problem and arriving at a solu­
tion. Reading assignments were given the committee members in order to
1 6
History of The United States Naval War College, 1884-1958 (Naval 
Department Library, Washington Naval Yard: Microfilm Number MIC. lh,
1959), p. 3.
17Philip A Crowl, "Education versus Training at The Naval War 
College: 1884-1972," Naval War College Review, 26 (Nov Dec 1973):
p. 5.
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assist in their deliberations. Finally, the solution of each committee
was discussed in class with the instructor serving as a monitor. This
method tended to approach German methodology. However, closer to it
was the "applicatory" method.
In 1910, the "applicatory" method was introduced at the Naval War
College. The system was not new in that it had been previously used at
the Army's schools at both Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth. However,
while it was originally adopted by the Army from the system used by the
German staff colleges and war schools, it gained a new sophistication
19
at the Naval War College. The objective of this method at the Naval 
College was to cultivate in the minds of the naval officers the habit 
of systematic reasoning in resolving tactical and strategic problems. 
The method required an individual rather than a group solution for the 
problems. The process consisted of estimating the situation involved 
in a given problem, making a concrete decision on the problems, and 
formulating orders for carrying out the decision. The applicatory 
method marked a new phase in the College's curriculum and it is con­
sidered to have influenced naval thought in the direction of a more
20
concrete conception of war and the Navy's relation to war. The next 
instructional method introduced at the Naval War College was the "case 
study."
^ History of the U. S. Naval War College 1884-1958, p . 7. 
20Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight and Lieutenant William D. 
Puleston, History of the United States War College, p. 13.
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W. Royce Powell says the "case study" method of instruction was
21
introduced at The Naval War College from abroad. This, however, could
not be confirmed from the literature used in this investigation. Rather,
what was confirmed is that the earliest known use of cases was in the
diagnostic training of social workers shortly after the Civil War.
Later in the nineteenth century, the method was introduced in the
Harvard Law School by Christopher Langdell to present judicial decisions
22in a revolt against the less functional method of legal education.
Charles F. Fisher describes the case study method of instruction quite 
simply as "The use of cases to effect problem-centered learning". He 
further contends that the case is a factual written record of a situa­
tion, condition, and/or experience that may or may not contain a
readily identifiable problem, but definitely contains the results and
23
sometimes the implications and analysis of actions. Whether the case
•> •
study method was introduced to the Naval War College from aboard or
from Harvard is irrelevant. Of significance is the fact that by the
early twentieth century the case study method had become one of the
main instructional strategies used at the Naval War College. Such
24
studies were also popular in the civilian graduate school.
21w. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," p. 37.
22
Charles F. Fisher, "Being There Vicariously by Case Studies," in 
On College Teaching, ed. Ohmer Milton and Associates (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978) ,  p. 260. See also Ronald Spector,
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The curricular emphasis on tactical studies with the lecture, war 
gaming, the applicatory method, and case studies as the major instruc­
tional strategies continued at the Naval War College throughout much 
of the early twentieth century. Neither Admiral William Sims nor 
Admiral Raymond Spruance, who served as Presidents of the College through­
out much of the period, substantially changed the curriculum. In fact,
Sims believed in the value of the German method and often defended the
25
value of theoretical knowledge applied to the naval profession,
but Spruance found work at the college a little more than "an intel- 
26
lectual desert." The situation changed dramatically after the close
of World War II. The curriculum was broadened to include many matters
not strictly naval or even military. The sights of the students were
raised from purely tactical, command and staff concerns to a much
higher level of decision making in the areas of strategy and national
27
policy according to Professor Philip A Crowl. "In a broad sense, one
can say that in 1947 the War College began a full 180 degree turn back
28
to the original concepts of Luce and Mahan."
The practice of extending invitations to professional historians 
and social scientists to lecture at the Naval War College began during 
the administration of Admiral Spruance. Spruance also invited a number
25
Philip A. Crowl, "Education versus Training at the Naval War 
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of representatives from the State Department to speak to the students 
at the Naval War College. The formal study of logistics was reintro­
duced into the curriculum as were advanced studies in politics and 
economics. Professioxal chairs to be filled by distinguished civilian 
educators were established. Other studies that were introduced included 
a core curriculum consisting of the fundamentals of strategy studies 
with associated sub-courses in International Relations, Evolution of 
Strategy, Theory, Military Management, Economics, and Comparative 
Cultures.
In spite of these somewhat radical changes in the curriculum, the 
Naval War College came under increasing criticism both from within the 
naval command and from civilian scholars and educators. According to 
Professor Crowl, after World War II excessive attention was given to 
the Soviet Union at the expense of the'rest of the nations of the world. 
Further the superficial treatment of its many subjects, its endless and 
rapid succession of visiting lecturers, along with an over concentra­
tion on the contemporary scene, and an corresponding underemphasis on
the historical and sociological context in which current events were
29
transpiring were the main criticisms of the curriculum. It was 
against this background that Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, a later 
President of the College, inaugurated a new course of study which, in 
his mind, represented "A return to our great traditions— to the
30
strategic and historical contribution of men like Mahan. . . . "
29
Ibid., p. 8.
30Ibid. Details of this new study may be found in Stansfield 
Turner, "Naval War College 1972-1973: Report of the President1 in
Naval War College Review 26 (Sept. - Oct., 1973) pp. 2-6.
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A major component in the establishment of the new curriculum at 
the Naval War College by Admiral Turner was the Contemporary Civiliza­
tion Lecture Series. This voluntary program served to promote the 
College in the dual role of an academic and community cultural center 
as well as a center for higher professional education. Admiral Turner 
said of the program:
This series provided a personal enrichment program for student, 
staff, faculty, and wives of the War College . . . .  The subjects 
covered were intended to be material not [necessarily] related 
to the college curriculum, but of general interest to the 
students as citizens and informed persons.31
More directly related to the new curriculum was the Current
Strategy Forum. Initially this program was begun in 1948 to allow the
students to exchange ideas with a wide cross section of the civilian
community. The program was first called "Roundtable Discussions" and
later "Global Strategy Discussions." Under Admiral Turner, the Current
Strategy Forum brought students face to face with leaders in government,
the civilian community and with flag officers. The students discussed
with these leaders selected problems affecting the military and the
nation at large. The subjects of various discussions were dealt with
both by student papers prepared in advance of the forum as seminar
32
stimulators and by distinguished guest speakers.
As one looks back over the decades of curriculum and instructional 
development at the Naval War College, three developments appear to have
31
Stansfield Turner, "Naval War College 1972-1973: Report of the
President," pp. 25-26.
32Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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changed the demands which the Navy faced, thus requiring a change in
the College's curriculum. They were changes in U. S. foreign policy
and national strategy, difficult choices in the ordering of national
priorities due to the limitation in funds, and the fact that the time
when the U. S. Navy had a clear qualitative and quantitative advantage
33
at sea had passed. As these changes took place, so did the curri­
culum of the Naval War College to keep up with the demands brought by 
the new developments. The primary objective of the curriculum changes 
at the Naval War College was to sharpen the critical faculties of the 
students rather than teaching operational methodology. The curriculum
was, therefore, structured to a problem-solving approach treating the
34
areas of strategy, resource management, and naval tactics. The most
significant change in the curriculum in the modern era was a general
deemphasis of contemporary data and events in favor of providing studies
that would enable the officers to project into the future a number of
years rather than at their next tour of duty. Instruction began to
stress such areas as international law, communications, public affairs
in the total context of the Navy rather than in a series of separate
35and discrete fragments.
To accomplish this new direction, students were plunged into a 
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For instance, they were forced to probe the multiple meanings of such
basic concepts as "limited war," "spheres of influence," "balance of
power," and they were pushed to make connections between historical
36
examples and current practices. Less reliance was placed on outside
lectures and more of the teaching workload was passed to the resident 
37faculty. Dialogue between the Naval War College and civilian acade­
mic institutions was increased through exchange programs and coopera­
tive arrangements with civilian institutions of higher education. An 
advanced research program was established to permit students to delve 
into problems affecting the military that had defied solution. Most 
important is the fact that three trimesters were established to treat 
the major areas of Strategy and Policy, Defense Decision Making, and 
Naval Tactics. This program not only divided the student load, but 
it also meant that each faculty member would now have the opportunity
for research and further study during, one trimester period while teach-
38
ing for two trimesters. The Naval War College had indeed returned 
to the original ideas of Luce and Mahan, and had established for itself 
a distinctive character emphasized by its preeminence in the studies of 
national strategy and policy. Further, it had shown that adaptations 
of the German methods of critical thinking and problem solving to pre­
pare one for future decision making was the most appropriate instruc­
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had set the standard which was to he generally followed by most of the 
other Senior Service Colleges. The second such college to he estab- 
blished picked up that tradition and, using its own peculiar require­
ments, added to the development of curricula and instructional strategies 
for military Senior Service education. The Army War College adopted 
many of the standards of the Berlin War Academy, and followed many of 
the procedures established by the Naval War College. Yet, it had its 
own distinctive curriculum.
When General Tasker H. Bliss was given the responsibility for the 
new Army War College, one of the first things that concerned him was 
its curriculum. In 1899 he pondered the questions "What shall be taught?
How shall it be taught? and "How shall the teaching be extended to the
39
greatest number [of students]?" Bliss determined that it was
almost impossible to devise a curriculum for the Army War College which
did not repeat at least part of what was taught in one or more of the 
40
Army's schools. He, therefore, concluded that the college should 
deal with the study of the larger problems of military science-; devis­
ing plans related to the question of military preparation and movement 
in the time of war. Not.to be included were subjects such as military 
intelligence which was the prerogative of a special bureau of the General 
Staff; logistics or those subjects designed to teach officers to improve 
equipment, arms and other materials of war (because these were already
39George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College
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taught at other army service schools); and the theory of tactics as
41well as the practical application of such tactics. Like the Naval
War College, Bliss decided on teaching Army officers higher level
military strategy and tactics; and also like the Naval War College, he
proposed to use the war game as the most practical method of instruc-
42
tion. Lectures, however, were to supplement the war games.
Bliss organized the Army War College faculty into committees which 
emphasized area studies of other countries or which considered other 
services1 operational missions and tactics. Committee emphasis was 
later changed under Brigadier General William W. Wdtherspoon to con­
centrate on resources of the United States and other countries of the 
western hemisphere. European and Far Eastern countries were not con­
sidered worthy of study since formidable ocean barriers provided a 
natural defense to any unfriendly nations from these areas. The lone
exceptions were those areas of the Pacific where the United States had
• i j  . 4 3island possessions.
A program of coordinated lectures was introduced at the Army.War
College in 1906-1907. Seven lectures on military history and "thoughts
of war" were held. To this were added latest developments in industry
and science affecting military operations. Problems, divided into area
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44
tactical and strategic studies. The most significant modification
of the curriculum as compared to that developed by the Naval War
College was the addition of field trips to Civil War Battlefields where
the strategic implications of various Civil War campaigns could be 
45
studied on site.
Courses at the Army War College were suspended during World War 
I and were not reinstated until 1919 when Major General James W. 
McAndrew was appointed Commandant. Because 19 of the 24 officers 
selected for the faculty were stationed in France and Germany with the 
American Expeditionary Forces, McAndrew held the first meeting of the 
new faculty at Treves, Germany. The faculty tackled the problem of a 
new curriculum based on lessons learned during combat. Since the new 
emphasis was to train officers for duties on the General Staff and for 
preparation'for war, the faculty decided on a curriculum that emphasized 
the study of military, economic, political, sociological and geo­
graphical capabilities of Great Power countries; particularly those
with whom the U. S. might become' engaged in combat in the future (for
47
example Russia and Germany).
The responsibility for the preparation and overall supervision of 
the curriculum was given to an Academic Board in 1921. The first Board
44 , 
Ibid., PP . 51-52.
45--,Ibid., P- 60.
4 6 t ^Ibid., P- 90.
47^., Ibid., P- 93.
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consisted of the Commandant of the College, the Assistant Commandant
48and the Directors of the various divisions of the faculty. Concomit­
antly with its development of the curriculum, the board selected con­
tinuance of small committees as the primary method for students perfor­
mance. The board also established a requirement for individual research 
projects. Even so, the research project reports were submitted through 
the appropriate committee structure. However, these and other regular com­
mittee reports which were normally prepared as staff papers were later
49presented orally to the entire college.
Following World War II, the major impact on the curriculum of the 
Army War College was the realization that global conflict involved 
political, economic and other considerations far beyond conventional 
military and naval affairs."*^ This suggested changes in national and 
intenational studies similar to that instituted by the Naval War 
College. National strategy and its supporting military programs became 
the central unifying theme of the curriculum at the Army War College.
The fields of study under this concept dealt with National Power and 
International Relations; Military Concepts, Theater Operations and 
Readiness; and National Strategy and Military Programs. According to 
Major General William P. Ennis, Jr., a former Commandant of the Army 
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only in its purely professional aspect, but in the broad context of the
Army as a key element in the defense team. [Further they stressed the
Army] as the traditional and dependable source of trained leaders to
fill top-level national and international command or staff jobs as re-
51quired by the nation's need for leadership skills . . . . " It was, however, 
the introduction of the Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) in 1971 that 
revealed the necessity to institute changes in the curriculum that would 
enable the graduates of the Army War College to master changes wrought by 
civilian and military decisions and concepts rather than be driven by 
them.
Instructional methods following World War II were based primarily
on individual student study, research, and the analysis and resolution
52
in committee of assigned problems of current significance. Faculty
advisors were assigned to assist student committees. The advisor did
not act as an instructor. He was free to join the discussion and, if
asked, to voice his opinion, but the committee was at liberty either to
accept or reject his opinion. Thus, the final views of the committee
53
members were their own and not that of the advisor. Most students,
(except those involved in war gaming) were required to prepare and to
present an original thesis on a subject of importance and of either
current and/or future value to the Army. This paper enabled the student to
demonstrate his ability to analyze a problem objectively and to do origi-
54nal and creative thinking. A National Strategy Seminar provided the
-^Major General William P. Ennis, Jr., "The Army's Top-Level 
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culmination for the curriculum. This essentially was "a student- 
developed national strategy and its principal implementing courses of 
action, with emphasis upon supporting military program [which was] 
examined and refined in collaboration with distinguished military and 
civilian guests.
The Army War College was not particularly known for innovations 
in its curriculum development. However, it did become a leader in the 
use of business-oriented computer information systems in order to improve 
the teaching of management techniques. The thrust of the information 
systems at the War College was to involve the student in computer-based 
models and simulations which were integrated with one's learning ex­
perience. The aim was to familiarize the student with modern informa­
tion techniques and retrieval systems to relieve the student of time
56
consuming statistical research.
Another innovation was the creation of a department of management 
and the expansion of management courses in order to keep up with the 
changing educational environment in both the military and civilian 
sectors. Like the Navy, the Army sharply curtailed its lectures from 
outsiders and began concentrating on courses designed to develop the 
managerial abilities of its students as well as to improve overall pro­
fessionalism among its attendees. A 43 hour course was developed that 
included six major sub-courses: "The United States and The Interna­
tional Environment"; "International Strategic Appraisals"; "Management 
and Executive Development"; "Strategic Military Studies"; "Military
56"The Role of Information Systems in the War College Curriculum," 
Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College 2 (Feb. 1972) 2:76-77.
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Forces Alternative Studies"; and "National Security Issues". In addi­
tion, other offerings were added to the curriculum. These included a 
National Strategic Seminar of one week's duration, a student research 
program, elective courses, and a 3 day field trip to the United Nations 
with longer trips to the Canadian capital in Ottawa and to American 
installations in Panama.
In retrospect, the changing curriculum at the Army War College 
was designed in anticipation and response to changes on the world scene, 
changes in academia, and to ensure that the Army's senior graduates 
could master those changes rather than be driven by them. The primary 
result was a reduction in the common core phase of the curriculum, the 
elimination of excessive rigidity as well as the heavy concurrent de­
mands on study. Rather, greater recognition was given in the curriculum 
to the importance of the student's past experiences and to his educational 
levels. Both of these factors were considered important in the students 
overall professional educational development.^^ To assure the accomplish­
ment of appropriate changes in the curriculum, its development was ulti­
mately placed in the hands of a faculty board consisting of The Deputy 
Commandant of the College, each of the faculty division chairmen, the 
Chief of the Plans and Policy Group, and the Secretary of The College.
The Board reviewed the individual courses proposed by the various divi­
sions of The College or by the Department of the Army, and decided which 
ones should be retained, modified, or eliminated. Their action, how­
ever, was subject to approval of its next higher headquarters, the 
United States Continental Army Command, and/or the Deputy Chief of
"^Lt. Col. Benjamin E. Doty, "Opening Some Windows at the Army 
War College", Army 23, (February 1973) 2: 22-23.
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Staff for Personnel at Department of the Army since these headquarters 
had responsibility for the conduct of the entire Army School System. 
However, the Board's action was usually approved at the other levels.
While the Army and Navy had set as their goals the teaching of 
higher level domestic and international strategy and policy subjects to 
the students at their War Colleges, and to train them in decision making 
at the higher levels, the newest of the services War College took a 
different direction in the development of its curriculum. The Air War 
College's curriculum did not mirror that of the Army War College or the 
Navy War College. Therefore it established for the youngest of the 
three service's Senior Schools a distinctive flavor that was to become 
unique in military higher education.
The foundation of the Air War College's curriculum was "airpower 
as an instrument of national policy". This base remains today. Of , 
course the direction of the curriculum has changed over the years, but 
the basic intent has not. Airpower as a national asset still remains 
the cornerstone of the curriculum. For many years, most of the seminars 
and guest speakers concentrated heavily on the formulation of national 
security policy. The students found themselves being prepared mainly 
for high-level policy making posts with less emphasis on the employment 
of air power. Individuals at the Air War College who were responsible 
for development of the curriculum saw this as a drawback to the mission 
and purpose of the College. They did not want to follow the example of 
the Army and the Navy in creating a curriculum whose major thrust was on 
national policy and strategy; rather, they decided to focus on the cur­
rent airforce missions and the capability to accomplish them, especially 
in a NATO environment. As a result, studies in courses such as close 
air support, interdiction, electronic warfare, surveillance and recon-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
naissance, airbase defense, airlift, air logistics, command control and
58
communications, and defense surpression were emphasized in great detail.
The Air War College also turned to more use of in-house faculty
than either the Army oi Navy War Colleges, and concurrently reduced the
number of outside speakers. At its height, the College relied on approxi-
59mately 250 instructors, most of them military. Further, the College
downgraded emphasis on cooperative advance degree arrangements with
civilian institutions. Like both its sister service's war colleges, the
Air War College initially established programs wherein their students
could obtain credit for courses taken either at their own institution
or at selected distinguished civilian universities (such as George
Washington University). The credits could be applied toward an advanced
degree from the civilian university. Many of the Air Force students,
like those from the Army and Navy, rushed to obtain the advance degrees.
However, authorities at the Air War College began to discourage the
students because they felt the Air War College's program came first, and
there was little time to attend to the Air War College's requirements
and do justice at the same time to advanced graduate studies at civilian 
60
universities. Consequently, outside advanced degree programs became 
strictly off-duty programs and secondary in priority. Work at civilian 
institutions such as George Washington University, Harvard University, 
and the University of Alabama was eliminated and whatever off-duty ad­
vance degree studies that were accomplished was done at nearby campuses
58Ed Gates, "New Look at the Air War College", Air Force Magazine 
60, (January 1977): 55.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of colleges such as Troy State and Auburn.
Thus, the Air War College's curriculum was developed to concen­
trate on four basic areas: Leadership and management; Domestic,
Economic, and Social Problems and Crisis Management; Strategy and 
Capabilities (particularly as they relate to the Soviet Union and Red 
China); and Military Capabilities and Employment. Additionally, the 
College had a research requirement for graduation. The culminating 
experience of the academic years was a large scale computer-assisted 
Theater Warfare Exercise.
One factor, organization, seems to account for the reason that the 
Air War College's curriculum was such a departure from that of the Army 
War College and the Naval War College. Both the Army War College and 
the Naval War College, as the top professional school of their services, 
were not an integral part of the rest of their school systems. They 
were under different administrative and/or supervisory authority. The 
Air War College, however, is a constituent part of the Air University —  
the umbrella organization for AirPorce schools located at Maxwell Air­
force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The Air Force has combined within this 
one university system institutions comparable to the Command and General 
Staff Colleges of the other services and to the Senior Service Colleges. 
This integrated system apparently fosters a closer relationship between 
the upper and lower level schools in the system whose orientations are 
different, while at the same time engendering throughout the systems a 
greater need to know how the Airforce fights rather than how to develop 
national policy. This departure from traditional military Senior 
Service School organization and the Airforce's decision to emphasize air­
power as an instrument of national policy rather than emphasize education
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
in subjects relating to national policy and strategy decision making cer­
tainly made the Air War College's curriculum distinctive. However, 
the remaining Senior Service Colleges did not follow the Air Force's 
example. The remaining schools continued the emphasis on decision mak­
ing at the national and international levels started by the Army and 
Navy. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), however, went 
part of the way with the Air War College and tied its curriculum closely 
to its mission, but with a difference. The ICAF curriculum dealt with 
the economic, industrial, scientific and technological aspects of 
security; therefore, ICAF viewed them in the broad context of national
and world affairs and the interrelated military, political, and social
61
factors impacting on national security. The emphasis in ICAF's cur­
riculum seems to have been a cross between the Air Force theory of cur­
riculum development on one hand and the Army and Navy on the other.
The ICAF curriculum was really unique unto itself because it was 
the only one of the Senior Service Schools dealing entirely with re­
sources management. In the early days of the College, the curriculum 
consisted of six basic courses covering the main facets of national 
security and the resources management policies of the Department of 
Defense. Additionally, there were four foundation courses (economic 
analysis, quantitative analysis in management, executive action, and 
automatic data processing systems); finally, there were seventeen elec­
tives offered the students. Later, core courses were added and these 
were designed to be presented in a logical order. Sequentially, they
6XHayden J. Price, "Student Diversity-ICAF's Unique Solution", 
Armed Forces Management 15, (March, 1969) 6:68.
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progressed from general background information and environmental 
studies (such as Environment of National Security, Basic Resources, 
Management of Industrial Resources) to intensive study of specific 
areas of national security management (such as National Security Prob­
lems and Policies, National Economic Problems and Policies, and Manage­
ment in the Department of Defense). Emphasis throughout the core pro­
gram was placed on the integration of problems, current issues, and new 
developments.^
The curriculum included independent student research whereby the 
student, either individually or as a team member, prepared a substantial 
research report which might have taken the form of a thesis, article 
for publication, staff study, or case study (often the case studies 
were used in subsequent years in various courses). Or, as an option to 
preparing the long paper, the student could elect to prepare three shor­
ter papers on subjects related to the core' curriculum. Field trips were 
added to the curriculum and soon became an important part of the learn­
ing process at the College. Trips were conducted to industrial plants 
such as Sperry Rand Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, and 
Radio Corporation of America where students had an opportunity to investi­
gate first hand some of the management problems they had been studying 
all year. Additionally, through agreements with certain civilian uni­
versities such as George Washington University, certain ICAF courses
and their associated research (thesis) projects were credited toward a
63masters degree in Business Administration.
^Ibid., p. 69.
63Ibid., p. 70.
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ICAF's basic orientation lent itself to certain distinctive inno­
vations which either had not been introduced at the other Senior Service 
Schools, or if introduced was utilized on a much reduced scale. Student 
orientation is a case in point. Even before a student selected to 
attend ICAF registered, his special instructional needs were identified 
through use of a questionnaire, responses of which were stored in a data
retrieval system. This information enahled the faculty to tailor courses 
64
for him. Another innovation that proved successful was student critiques 
which were employed to help determine changes in various courses. Each 
student turned in a data card evaluating each of the day’s sessions.
The comments were analyzed by the college’s staff and steps were taken 
to remedy any problems uncovered. Finally, Computer-Assisted Instruction 
(CAI) became a very important part of the College's methodology.
Expecially widely used was TUTOR, a series of 36 CAI lessons on basic 
programming of computers.
The rising sophistication of the ICAF students challenged the 
designers of the ICAF curriculum as the College entered the post World 
War II period; especially the 1960's and 1970's. In one year (1971), 
for example, it was discovered that a total of 103 students had master 
degrees, and 6 students had doctoral level degrees. Thus, 60% of the 
class had advanced degrees. In contrast, just 6 years earlier only 66 
students had masters degrees and 7 had doctorates totaling 40% of the 
class. Most of the advanced degrees were in business and public admini­
stration. Since graduate-level work in these fields was especially 
akin both to the b.road theme and to several specific parts of the ICAF
64Ibid., p. 68.
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program, it was an every-present concern at the College to avoid need­
less duplication of a student's previous academic work. At the same
time, comparable courses had to be presented to those students who had 
65
not had them.
The college tried to avoid duplication by examining students' 
background, counseling with them and excusing those who had already had 
comparable course work from taking one or more of the foundation courses.
For each required course previously completed, he had to enroll in an
equivalent elective course.
Dr. Fred Brown, a professor of management at ICAF and Adjunct
Professor of Public Administration at the American University sums up
curriculum development at ICAF this way:
ICAF's problems of course design and presentation are
quite similar to those of all educational programs which 
cater to the needs of adults with highly varied and exten­
sive professional and educational experiences. In the . . .  
development of the ICAF curriculum, changes have been made 
in content and methodology to meet the increasing academic 
sophistication of incoming students. Our recent study of 
students with previous master's degrees in business or pub­
lic administration has re-emphasized the importance of 
intensified attention to tailoring a student's ICAF studies 
to fit his specific background.66
Because of its orientation in resources management, ICAF's curriculum
was more closely identified with curricula at civilian institutions of
higher education than most of the other military Senior Service Schools.
This is especially true in the areas of business administration and
management. However, one other Senior Service School's curriculum was
also closely identified with curricula at civilian institutions. The
^5Fred R. Brown, "Challenge to ICAF: More and More Highly Educated
Students", Perspectives in Defense Management (Jan. 1971): A3.
^Ibid., p. 45.
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National War College's curriculum paralleled International Studies, Politi­
cal Science and the History of Strategy and Policy taught at a number 
of civilian colleges and universities.
No less concerned with its academic offerings, the National War 
College also made its contribution to development of curricula for the 
Senior Service Colleges. Although preceeded by the Army War College 
and the Naval War College, the eminence of the National War College in 
national and international policy and strategy studies are unsurpassed. 
Covering all disciplines in the field of national security, the National 
War College became to the Senior Service Colleges what the "Research 
Universities" had become to civilian institutions of higher education
(based on the Carnegie.. topology of grouping American colleges and 
67
universities). As a result of its curriculum, faculty and student 
body, the National War College became the standard by which the other 
were judged.
The curriculum of the National War College was a prototype for 
courses leading to excellence in research and creative thinking. Courses 
covered in the National War College's curriculum, for example, have in­
cluded such important national and international studies as The World
In 1970, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education divided 
American Colleges and Universities into five major categories so that 
they could be grouped for comparison or discussion purposes based on 
similarities in curricula, faculty and students. The typology included: 
(1) Research Universities (those that were the most research oriented, 
received the most federal financial support for this purpose and awarded 
at least 50 Ph.Ds' in 1969-1970); (2) Doctorate-Granting Universities 
(those who awarded from 10 to 40 Ph.D.s in 1969-1970; (3) Comprehensive. 
Universities and Colleges (those who offered a liberal arts program, 
and or more professional courses of studies, and a limited doctoral 
program); (4) Liberal Arts Colleges (those with a strong liberal arts 
tradition and modest, if any occupational programs); and (5) Two-year 
Colleges (sometimes called community and junior colleges). For further 
details see Arthur Levine, Handbook on Undergraduate Curriculum (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), pp. xxiii-xxv and pp. 629-637.
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Situation; Factors Influencing National Power; Formulation of National 
Security Policy; Strategy and Warfare; and The Communists States. With­
in this background, students took suhcourses that combined studies in 
the classroom with field trips to the United Nations Headquarters and 
to five strategic areas of the world where they met and talked with pro­
minent world leaders. Coincident with these visits, the college had a 
requirement of individual study and research leading to a thesis in the 
field of National Security. The research program was designed not only 
to enable the student to take a fresh look at a subject of national
interest, but also to give him a chance to demonstrate his ability to
68do individual creative work. Encouragement in developing critical 
faculties through individual study and research have been the greatest 
strength of the curriculum of the National War College over the years.
While there has been refinements in the conduct of the courses at the 
College, individual study and research have remained its forte. The 
earliest effort to provide individual study and research was the even­
ing graduate study program started in cooperation with the George 
Washington University, and followed by the sending of selected individuals 
research papers of exceptional merit to the head of the author’s service 
or department on a regular basis. To make the results of such student 
research more widely known, unclassified summaries were published in the 
annual volume of Abstracts of Individual Research Papers and other publica-
Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harold, "Leadership for National 
Security, The General Electric Forum, 6 (Oct. - Dec. 1961) 3: 14.
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tions. Another strength of the College has been its visiting guest 
speaker program.
Since its beginning, the curriculum of the National War College has 
focused on a broad guest speaker program designed to provide the students ex­
pert views and a firm basis for the exchange of ideas in discussion 
seminars on a wide range of national security related issues and problems.
The guest speakers, drawn mostly from groups of responsible governmental 
officials and distinguished thinkers, were used to cover specific topics 
of the College’s curriculum. Use of these lecturers at the National 
War College was somewhat different from those at the Army and Navy War 
Colleges where the guest speakers usually talked on a topic of current 
interest that was not necessarily a part of the curriculum. It was not 
unusual for the National War College to utilize over 100 distinguished 
speakers to supplement its faculty in presenting curriculum courses 
during an academic year. The College zealously guarded the privacy of 
its guest speaker program by prohibiting those attending the lectures 
from attributing any statement to the speakers outside of the College. 
Consequently, the speakers knew that they could state their views freely and 
frankly. Further, it provided an atmosphere of free exchange in an 
uncontrolled environment. This was especially important in creating and
69In 1965, the National War College Forum was established for the 
purpose of publishing student research papers; later, it also published 
lectures for distribution to National War College students, Defense 
Strategy Seminar alumni (individuals who attended short summer courses at 
the College), senior government officials and to select civilian univer­
sity research centers. The Forum was retitled "The National Security 
Affairs Forum in 1973. See U.S. National War College, "The National War 
College Institutional Report for the Evaluation of the National War Col­
lege by the Office of the American Council on Education", National War 
College Historical Summary 1946-1973 (Washington: National War College, 
1974), p. 1.
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maintaining academic freedom since the College was a military institu­
tion subject to control from outside of the College. Unlike the other 
schools which cut back outside lecturers, wide use of guest speakers was 
an asset at the National War College in that it enabled the College to 
free its residential instructors of much of the classroom details in 
order that they could devote more time as advisors and monitors of 
students research efforts, and so they could spend more time in develop­
ing creative thinking abilities of the students.
The principal academic techniques the instructors used in guiding 
student efforts were discussion groups and committee problems. Discus­
sion groups were convened after each lecturg, and the topic of the day 
was discussed in detail. This learning technique was especially useful 
in helping to break down inter-service prejudices that might have 
existed among the students. More importantly, it enabled class members 
to understand and speak on different aspects of the problem being con­
sidered. Many of the problems discussed became subjects for further 
consideration by committees. However, most committee assignments 
resulted from problems such as those which the National Security Council 
and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff might face. Following the lead of the 
Army War College, an innovation in the committee technique at the 
National War College was the presentation of solutions to the problems 
to the entire class by the committee, and each class member was given the 
opportunity to challenge the solutions which the committee had to defend. 
In the final analysis, the committees had to develop a national strategy 
based on their findings.
In developing a national strategy, the students had to consider 
such things as an analysis of factors of national power of the United 
States and of other nations; the study of the integration of military
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and foreign policy; and the role of the United Nations, and other means
of avoiding armed conflicts. Further, they had to become proficient in
determining the influence of economic, political, psychological and
social resources upon national security; and they had to be able to
determine the parameters of the national interests and objectives. The
course designed to teach the students techniques in developing a national
strategy also included a study of military forces necessary to implement
national policy, strategy and war planning as well as the impact of
science and technology on the armed forces and their employment.^
An exercise during the last two months of the year served as the
culminating experience for the students. Lieutenant General Thomas L.
Harrold, a former*commandant or the National War College, neatly'sums
up curriculum development and instructional strategies at the College
while speaking of the grand culminating exercise. He said:
In this period the class devotes its entire effort, 
reinforced by especially selected lectures and reading, 
to a grand exercise covering top-level U.S. security 
policy formulation and implementation. From assumed 
positions of highest government authority, national 
goals and policy are developed. Based upon these 
goals and policy, a U.S. national strategy is con­
ceived and prepared, along with supporting world-wide 
plans and programs. As the climax to the National War 
College program this final period brings to focus 
the knowledge and experience gained from all earlier courses 
of the year.73-
In retrospect, one finds that inextricably mixed in the entire pro­
gram of instruction at the National War College was the development of skill 
in both research and in decision making. The curriculum and techniques
^Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, "The National War Col­
lege", Sperryscope 16 (1962) 1: 4.
71Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harrold, "Leadership for National 
Security", p. 15.
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of learning were, therefore, geared to these ends. Further, they were
devoted to a broadening of the knowledge of the student about the United
States and the rest of the world. The students were encouraged to
think on the problems facing the world and to devise their own solutions
to the problems. Finally, they were encouraged to discuss freely and
72
debate the problems and the merits of the solution. Commenting on
the curriculum, one member of the Civilian Board of Consultants had
this to say after a visit and evaluation of the school in 1949:
With respect to the curriculum, we have noted with 
satisfaction that flexibility has been maintained and 
that the course of study has been adapted to changing 
needs. In general we believe the present program 
strikes a fair balance between the international and 
military aspects . . . .  We commend also the effort being 
made to tie up the political and military aspects of 
the course during the concluding week of the y e a r . 73
A review of curriculum development and instructional strategies 
at the five Senior Service Schools points up one consistent similarity
72
Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, "The National War Col­
lege", p. 4.
73Since early in the history of the National War College, a 
Civilian Board of Consultants composed of distinguished educators have 
been appointed to evaluate and guide the college in its curriculum 
development and administration. One of the first such boards to issue 
a comprehensive written report was the board of 1949-1950 which con­
sisted of: Dr. J. E. Wallace Sterling (President of Stanford University);
Dr. George D. Stoddard (President of the University of Illinois); Dr.
James P. Baxter, 3rd (President of Williams College); Dr. Calvin B.
Hoover (Dean of the Graduate School of Duke University); Dr. William L. 
Langer (Department of History, Harvard University); Dr. Arnold 0.
Wolfers (Director of the Division of Social Sciences and the Social 
Science Planning Center, Yale University). For additional details, 
see "Report of the Board of Consultants of the National War College" in 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers 962/92, 7 October 1949, Modern Military 
Branch,Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 7),
The National Archives.
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among the schools. That is the sameness in general courses and 
methodologies in spite of apparent differences in missions and objec­
tives of each college. There is a reason for this which can be summed 
up in one word "uniformity." Uniformity among the curricula of the 
five schools did not happen by chance. It was planned that way, and 
the Clements Board was responsible for the results.
The Clements Board was a blue ribbon panel convened for the pur­
pose of making a comprehensive study of the curricula at the five 
Senior Service Colleges and to recommend guidelines to be followed by 
each school in refining its curriculum in accordance with the goals of 
educational excellence shared by the Board and the Colleges. Headed by 
the Honorable W. P. Clement, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, it in­
cluded Howard H. Calloway (Secretary of the Army), J. William Middendorff 
(Secretary of the Navy), John L. McLucas (Secretary of the Air Force), 
and William K. Brehm (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs). The Board developed three mutually reinforcing compo­
nents of the curriculum for the Senior Service Colleges. A Common Core 
outline was developed as suitable for implementation at each college.
A Mission-Specific curriculum outline was developed for each separate in­
stitution which would be supportive of and would complement the Common 
Core curriculum while at the same time stressing its unique mission 
orientation. Finally, the Board developed a Tailored Elective Program 
outline which permitted the tailoring of each student's educational ex­
perience to his background and service needs. Of these three elements 
of the recommended curriculum, the Clements Board felt that the 
Mission-Specific phase should be the dominant factor both in intensity 
and magnitude because it was in this ingredient that the specific focus 
of the college could best be developed in all of its dimensions.
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Further, it would serve as a unifying factor at each school thus main­
taining and giving emphasis to the requirement for separate institutions
*7 /.
within the services.'n
In addressing the Common Core element, the Board believed that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) could not support five Senior Service 
Colleges at a level of excellence if each school focus was too large.
It;therefore,tried to build an outstanding core program addressing only 
those common needs of each school. This, the Board believed, would re­
lieve the faculties of certain basic requirements and would permit them 
to concentrate on developing and maintaining a program of true intel­
lectual substance based on the school's particular mission orientation.^ 
Consequently, the Board determined that the "Common Core should include 
courses which would develop a sound basic understanding of the following:
— The decision-making process within the Department of 
Defense and the interrelationship of its components.
— National Security Policy formulation and the relation­
ship of DOD to the other Executive Departments, the 
White House, and the Congress.
— Management skills and selected analytical techniques; 
to include specific attention to the uses and limita­
tions of computers in the decision process.
76
— The National and International environment."
While the Board did not specify exactly how much of the curriculum
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report of the DOD 
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Services Colleges: 
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should be Common Core, it did suggest approximately one-third of the 
total curriculum. For administrative purposes, the Board suggested 
that the President of the Naval War College be given responsibility for 
coordinating the Common Core program.
In recommending Mission-Specific Courses, the Board "[did] not 
mean that the colleges should confine their inquiry to existing practices 
or narrow single-service concerns; rather that in addressing the full 
range of issues judged appropriate, each should do so from the conscious 
perspective of the implications for its special mission field. 
Consequently, the Army War College was to devote itself to courses 
dealing with land warfare, the Naval War College to those courses deal­
ing with naval warfare, the Air War College to courses dealing with 
aerospace warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to courses 
dealing with defense management and material acquisition, and the 
National War College would deal exclusively with national security 
policy formulation. The Board foresaw two primary results of the 
Mission-Specific Curriculum:
First, the environment of the Colleges [would] nurture 
the development of an executive minded set. Second, 
it [would] reinforce the effort of each college to 
strengthen its position as a recognized and respected 
center of intellectual excellence to which profes­
sional officers are attracted for study, and to which 
scholars are attracted to teach and conduct r e s e a r c h .
Again, the Board suggested that Mission-Specific subjects comprise
approximately one-third of the total curriculum at each school. The
Board further suggested that the Commandant of the Air War College take
the lead in coordinating Mission-Specific subjects.
^Ibid., p. 5.
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The Clements Board concluded that the individual should have the 
opportunity to tailor his electives based on his career experience. In 
this connection, the Board pointed out that officers attending the 
Senior Service Colleges bring with them fifteen to twenty years of dif­
fering experience, and that this experience could benefit both the col­
lege and the individual officers if it could be nurtured and revealed
79through formal study. However, the Board felt that certain criteria 
had to be met in developing the electives. First, they should be' con­
fined to topics which fell within the specific mission field of the col­
lege. Second, they should require thorough and rigorous examination of
* _
the subject matter. The Board further felt that the electives, and 
accompanying research should be tailored to the individual needs of the 
student, and should consist of approximately one-third of an individual's 
curriculum. For administrative purposes, the Commandant of the Army 
War College was given the lead in coordinating electives.
The Clements Board looked into one other important aspect of the 
Senior Service instruction: teaching methodology. It found that all of
the colleges used a combination of techniques which included guest lec­
turers, faculty lectures, student-led seminars, and faculty led seminars. 
The colleges, however, differed as to the emphasis placed on the various 
techniques. The committee concluded that while there was no rule for 
optimizing the learning environment, but there should be some general 
guidelines to be followed by all the Senior Service Colleges. First, 
peer learning should only be emphasized as a secondary technique and
79
Ibid., p. 6.
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should not be relied on as a primary means of developing the central 
curriculum themes. Second, guest lecturers should be used to expose 
students to differing perspectives, and to bring to the student a sense
of current real-world situations. However, the role of the guest
lecturer should also be secondary. Third, the resident faculty must be
the ones who develop the curriculum themes in classroom and seminar
settings.
A positive result of the Clements Board efforts was closer coopera­
tion among the Senior Service Schools in curriculum and instructional 
planning and development. This is most vividly displayed through meet­
ings of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which was 
established in 1962 especially for the purpose of coordinating military 
education at the Senior Service College level. The MECC was composed 
of the heads of the senior institutions with the Commandant of the 
National War College as chairman.
In summarizing curriculum development and the development of in­
structional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges, certain conclu­
sions can be drawn. First, each school’s curriculum tended to distin­
guish it from the others because, while there was a certain degree of 
uniformity among all the Colleges, the mission and objectives of each 
required a curriculum that was unique to the particular institution 
concerned. Second, the very nature of the Senior Service Schools being 
military activities made it so the institutions did not have to worry 
about the recruiting and retention of students. Therefore, the developers 
of the curriculum were free to concentrate on courses of study that would 
accomplish the mission of the institutions rather than having to con­
sider courses that would merely attract and retain students. Third, 
courses at the Senior Service institutions not only contained depth in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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subject matter but also were of the type that gave great breadth to the 
curriculum. Fourth, the curriculum and methodologies of instruction in 
the American military Senior Service Colleges were originally adapted 
from European military schools; especially the Berlin War Academy. Fifth, 
emphasis at all the American Senior institutions was on stimulating 
logical thought processes although the method of accomplishing this 
goal varied with each school.
While there was uniformity of goals there seemed to be differences 
in implementation. Decision making on matters affecting national 
strategy and policy, and the supporting military programs to carry out 
the decisions made at the highest levels were emphasized at both the 
Naval War College and the Army War College. The Air War College's 
emphasis on airpower as an instrument for national policy and the con­
current emphasis on the study of mission-oriented topics gave this 
institution a distinctive character that caused it to be different from 
the other Senior Service Schools. The Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces concern with resources management at the national level brought 
to it a great number of students already possessing advanced degrees.
This caused a problem in developing a curriculum that would avoid need­
less duplication of a student's prior educational attainments. Close 
attention to student questionnaires, critiques and suggestions brought 
about an excellent program of tailoring subjects to the students needs. 
More importantly, visits to civilian industrial plants provided the 
students with an ingredient that was invaluable to rounding out their 
classroom discussions. Finally, the National War College's emphasis on 
the development of skills in creative thinking and in research as aids 
to decision making on matters of national and international importance 
led to a curriculum that more closely parallel curricula at civilian
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institutions than any of the other Senior Service Schools except the 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Also important was the emphasis on individual creative work 
vis-a-vis committee or group endeavors; this gave the National War Col­
lege a distinctive character when compared to the other Senior military 
institutions. Curriculum development and the development of instruc­
tional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges were distinguished by 
a desire for excellence. The high level Clements Board attempted to 
achieve this educational excellence by specifying the types of courses 
which should concern all the Senior Schools. Core courses, mission- 
essential courses, and a tailored elective program were thought to be the 
most logical means of insuring educational excellence while at the same 
time establishing a need for each of the schools and distinguishing the 
differences among them. The degree to which this was accomplished is 
the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
REASONS.FOR EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE 
SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS
Is there really any fundamental difference between the Senior 
Service Colleges that would substantiate their existence? Or, simply 
put, are all five of the Senior Schools needed? These questions have 
plagued both military and civilian leaders since the founding of the 
War Colleges, yet they have never been fully answered. There have 
been examinations made of the programs, costs and achievements at each 
of the Senior Colleges. However, few of the researchers writing about 
those schools have attempted to investigate why they exist, and almost 
none have attempted to answer the critical question of their need.
Perhaps Maureen Mylander came closest in an article in which she tried 
to determine whether or not the War Colleges were a wasted resource. 
Mylander looked at what the Colleges were all about and why they were 
founded. She also established many shortcomings of the Senior Service 
Schools, and what had been done about them. She reviewed the Colleges' 
operational costs, and examined whether or not the returns on the dollar 
were worth the costs. Finally she tried to determine whether there will be 
Wa.r Colleges in the future. She concluded: "As matters stand, the schools 
are not living up to their potential"; and then she says: "Whether they 
improve, or remain a costly and wasted resource, or even survive at all, 
will depend largely upon how they surmount [their] obstacles."'*' However,
^"Maureen Mylander, "The War Colleges: A Wasted Resource", The 
Times Magazine, March 7, 1977, pp. 6-14.
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nowhere does >she directly address whether or not any or all of the high
level military institutions are needed. Her article, like many other
writings on these schools, merely accept their existence and assume that
they will continue to exist. John Masland and Laurence Radway's book
Soldiers and Scholars, which is perhaps the most outstanding work on
military education, provides the best example of this omission. The
authors summarily dismiss the question of need by saying:
Fortunately there is no question about the need 
for these institutions. Indeed the extraordinary 
significance of this need is the underlying theme 
of this entire book . . . .  Probably their mere exis­
tence in itself constitutes a considerable contri­
bution to the security of the United States. If  ^
they did not exist, they would have to be created.
The authors do not provide any rationale for their contentions, nor do 
they provide any evidence to support their conclusions. Since the 
questions of need remain unanswered, it appears that investigating the 
subject as part of the overall development process of the institutions 
will provide some insight into their reasons for existing. It also 
appears that the best means of discovering the relevant facts and arriv­
ing at a defensible conclusion regarding the need for these schools can 
be done by comparing similarities and distinctive differences among the 
five military institutions. Before going into the similarities and dif­
ferences, it would seem logical to first establish why military graduate 
education is needed for senior officers.
William J. Taylor, Jr. and Donald F. Bletz contend that few would 
deny that military officers in particular require extensive graduate
John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: 
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957, p. 368.
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education and training to perform the many tasks of their profession.
In fact, they report that the requirement for officers with graduate
degrees to perform specialized tasks in the military service has grown
3
larger; especially during the decades of the 1960's and the 1970's. 
Clarence Hannon concurs. He says "During the past 20 years, there has 
been a constantly accelerating emphasis on graduate level education 
within DOD, but this trend has net been idiosyncratic to the Services; 
[rather it has reflected a similar trend in society at large]
To understand this requirement for graduate degrees, one must 
consider the fact that the Services needs are not limited to military 
oriented disciplines, such as tactics, logistics, military engineering, 
operational readiness, and the like. Rather, a significant number of 
officers are needed with advance education in the pure and social 
sciences; in relative new fields such as public administration, com­
puter operations, criminal justice, and the behavioral sciences; and 
in traditional professional fields as education, law, dentistry, 
medicine, religion, business administration and business management. 
Paul T. Karschnia explains it very simply. He says "To understand his 
trade properly, the officer must have some idea of other fields such 
as natural sciences, law, history, politics, economics, sociology, 
psychology, etc. and the ways in which these other areas of knowledge 
may contribute to his own purpose. In addition, he cannot really
3
William J. Taylor, Jr. and Donald F. Bletz, "A Case for Officer 
Graduate Education," in Journal of Political and Military Sociology,
2 (Fall, 1974), 2: 253.
4
Clarence W. Hannon, Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces 
(Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Army War College, 1974), p. 145.
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develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if
5
he is trained simply in vocational duties." Thus, to keep pace with 
the ever changing technology of war; the social, economic and politi­
cal changes in society, the military officer must have an advanced 
education. During the early 1970's for example, the Services validated
advanced graduate degree requirements for oyer 25,000 officers 
6
a year. Of this total,- the Airforce needed approximately 
46 percent, the Army 28 percent, the Navy 24 percent and the Marine 
Corps required approximately 2 percent of the graduate positions.^
Peter Dawkins succinctly summarizes the reasons officer graduate 
education is needed. He says graduate education is needed in the 
military because of: growing specialization in the many fields 
military personnel becomes involved, the expanding domestic and foreign 
roles of the military'officer in particular, and the increasing complex-
g
ity of leadership and management in military units and operations.
Paul T, Karschnia, Education, The War Colleges and Professional 
Military Development (Washington: The National War College Strategic 
Research Group, n.d.), p. 3.
g
Validation of military graduate degree requirements is the act 
of designating by job title, job description and rank those specialized 
positions that must be filled by an individual possessing a specific 
advanced degree. This validation takes place annually by each of the 
Armed Services reviewing all those positions already in-being and those 
new ones proposed for inclusion on the required list. The positions 
selected after this review are reported to the Department of Defense 
where with the sanction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve 
Affairs, Manpower and Logistics), they are finally approved. For a 
further discussion on the validation process, see Taylor and Bletz, "A 
Case for Officer Graduate Education," pp. 251-2.66.
^Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education," p. 262.
g
Peter Dawkins, "Some Issues Involved in the Education of Officers" 
in The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. Lawrence 
J. Korb, International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9 
(Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 160.
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There are other benefits of graduate military education that
are less tangible, but just as important in the development of good
officers. Raoul Alcala conducted research in the area of attitudes
held by the military and concluded that the officers with graduate
degrees are less likely to hold absolute attitudes on a subject than
other officers. He further said that officers with graduate degrees tend
to have a greater range of opinions; and, finally these officers are
significantly less likely to believe that a threat to the nation from
9
outside sources (such as communism) would lead to war. Josiah Bunting 
appropriately highlights any discussion on whether or not graduate edu­
cation is really needed by arguing for a liberally educated military.
He says, "The truly liberally educated soldier is the soldier who can 
reconcile the necessity for training and education and be happy with 
hoth." Bunting concludes "The man who is both liberally and profes­
sionally educated will be the better soldier."^ According to Taylor 
and Bletz, the Services provide for graduate education, whether it be 
a liberal education or a professional education, in several ways:
First, there are fully-funded and sponsored programs 
under which an officer is selected to be a full time 
student for one or two (exceptionally three) years at 
an accredited civilian institution to complete a 
masters degree or a doctorate. • • Second, there are
Q
Raoul Alcala, "Education and Officer Attitudes" in The System 
for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., Ed. Lawrence J. Korb, 
International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: 
University of Pittsburg, 1967), pp. 136-145.
■^Josiah Bunting, "The Humanities in The Education of the 
Military Professional" in The System for Educating Military Officers 
in the U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association 
Occational Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967), 
p. 158.
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fully-funded programs involving a much smaller number 
of officers selected to attend either the Navy Post­
graduate School or The Air Force Institute of Tech­
nology.* • • • Third, officers can enroll in programs co­
sponsored by civilian colleges and universities and 
some of the professional military educational insti­
tutions . . . .  Fourth, a significant number of officers 
complete their advance degrees on their off-duty 
time and at their own expense, although some monetary 
assistance is available through military and VA 
sponsorship.H
Regardless of how the degree is obtained, there are those who 
argue that advanced education for professional military officers is 
hest obtained through civilian colleges and universities. Adam 
Yarmolinsky is one who believes that education of the military should 
take place in a civilian environment. He gives three reasons for this. 
First, he says that education requires a freedom of inquiry that is 
just not present in a military institution. He contends that "Military 
institutions are caught in a dilemma . . .  to the extent that they are 
military, they must support a tradition of acceptance of orders, ad­
herence to prescribed procedures, and deference to established hierarchy.
To the extent that they are educational institutions, their allegiance
12
is to [a set of values involving freedom of inquiry]". After all,
freedom of inquiry is basic to the educational process. Without it, 
the teacher cannot teach, the student cannot learn, and the scholar can­
not explore the frontiers of knowledge. Yarmolinsky points out that 
freedom of inquiry in the military is necessarily restricted by the
11Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education",
p. 262.
12Adam Yarmolinsky, "Where Should The Officer Obtain His Educa­
tion" in The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. 
Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association Occasional Papers, 
No. 9 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 151.
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requirement to give swift obedience to orders. Elisabeth T. Crawford 
is another who believes in providing education for the military in a 
civilian environment. She agrees with Yarmolinsky that the military 
Senior Service institutions lacks academic freedom. She says it this 
way:
The locus of these institutions, within the military 
authority structure, however, imposes constraints on the 
academic model. Among these are the problems of recon­
ciling the academic principle of free intellectual 
inquiry with military conceptions of propriety and re­
sponsibility, especially in the treatment of political 
matters
Yarmolinsky's second reason for advocating the education of the 
military in a civilian college or university is that one is able to
«r •*» )
gain fresh, new ideas as well as learn to be flexible in his thinking
whereas the military remains rigid and inflexible.^ Alcala says "For
the professional officer, civilian graduate level schooling provides
an environment that encourages intellectual growth away from the
technical and tactical concerns that completely dominate the normal
16military assignments." (In other words he is really saying that the 
quality of military education is least compromised when taught in the 
academic free environment of a civilian college and university rather 
than in a rigid military institution.)
14Crawford, Elisabeth T. "Education for Policy Roles: An Analysis 
of Lectures and Reading Materials at Selective War Colleges" in Papers 
Presented at the 62nd Annual Meeting of The American Sociological 
Association Held August 28-31, 1967, San Francisco (Washington: Bureau 
of Social Science Research, Inc., n.d.), p. 1.
15Adam Yarmolinsky, "Where Should the Officer Obtain His Education,"
p. 151.
16
Raoul Alcala, "Education and Officer Attitudes," p. 134.
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In a military environment, there is a tendency to present the
subject matter in a framework of military values which are likely to
18infect the substance of the course. More than likely, it is for 
this reason that when Joseph King asked over four hundred students at 
the Command and General Staff College of the Army that if given a 
choice, would they rather receive their advanced degrees from a civi­
lian or from a military institution. The overwhelming answer was
that they would rather receive their graduate degrees from a civilian 
19institution. This response is in sharp contrast to those answers 
given by approximately 2200 alumni of the National War College who 
were asked to consider their post-graduate careers and its relation­
ship to the demands of their assignments after graduation, then deter­
mine would they have been better off attending the National War College 
or a program at a civilian college. The National War College graduates
by a large margin gave the nod to the Senior Service School over civi-
20lian institutions. It is not difficult to assess reasons for this 
difference in opinions. The Command and General Staff College is a 
mid-level educational institution attended primarily by Majors and 
senior (or promotable) Captains, or by Lieutenants and Lieutenant 
Commanders in the Navy. These individuals usually have a great interest 
in doing those things that will greatly enhance their careers; or what 
service people refer to as "ticket punching". If there is one thing
18^ .,Ibxd.
19
Joseph King, "A Study of The Army's Advanced Civilian Schooling 
Programs", MA Thesis (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1973),
p. 18
20
The National War College Experience and Its Utilization: A 
Study Among Graduates of The National War College and Supervisors of 
Graduates (Princeton: Response Analysis Corporation, 1975), p. viii.
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about civilian graduate education that many military students on 
the subject agree, it is that young officers perceive that a graduate 
degree from a civilian college or university is prestigious and will 
do more to help them to attain promotion than attending a service 
institution. Conversely, older and higher ranking officers (Lieutenant 
Colonels, full Colonels, Commanders and Naval Captains) who attend the 
Senior Service College usually believe that they will ensure their 
selection to flag or general officer status by attending a Senior 
Service School. The least rank they anticipate achieving after having 
gone to a Senior Service College is Colonel or Navy Captain. Attend­
ing a civilian institution provides them with little value in this 
area. The result of all of this is that there is no clear cut position 
that the military takes on this question of the value of a civilian 
graduate education versus a military higher-level professional educa­
tion.
There is little doubt that weaknesses have existed in the mili­
tary's advanced civilian degree program for a long time. Civilian edu­
cation for military personnel, for example, does not evolve in a 
constituency comparable to civilian institutions. Graduates of civil­
ian institutions tand to identify with alumni associations and speci­
fically with "their college" of the university. This provides an 
esprit de corps among the group that results in many tangible benefits 
for both the institution and the individual.
Military officers are not likely to form a large portion of this 
"good old boy network" because they are not likely to attend the uni­
versity of college long enough to become identified with the institu­
tion. In some instances, such as attending off-duty studies or work/
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study graduate courses on military installations, the military indi­
viduals may never see the college or university from which they graduate. 
This system evokes little allegiance on the part of the officer. On the 
other hand, it is believed by some in the military hierarchy that alleg­
iance to a system is an important part in the training of an individual 
as a good officer. Old friendships established at military schools, 
especially the senior institutions, leads to a camaraderie, a trust in 
one another, that carries over to job assignments; particulary positions 
of responsibility in combat. It is difficult to explain to the profes­
sional officer that he will gain the same, allegiance from, or have the 
same faith in, an officer whom he met by chance in a civilian graduate 
institution as opposed to one with whom he was associated at a Senior 
Service College. William J. Taylor, Jr. puts it quite simply. He says 
"These constituencies believe deeply that the great military leaders
who emerged from the traditional military school system were great
21
leaders, in large measure, because of the traditional system." It is 
for this reason that civilian education of upper level military officers 
has been given a back seat in the senior military education system by 
both the military leaders and students. A case in point can be found in 
the study of National War College graduates and supervisors conducted by 
The Response Analysis Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey. When asked 
to consider their post-graduate careers and then determine if they 
would have been better off attending a military college or a civilian 
university, only two percent of the over 2200 individuals participating
"william J. Taylor, Jr., "Alternative Proposals for Fully Funded 
Graduate Education on Civilian Campuses" in The System for Educating 
Military Officers in the "U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International 
Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: Univ. of 
Pittsburg, 1967), p. 163.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 2 0
in the survey thought that they would have done better had they
22attended a civilian institution. Taylor and Bletz sums up the feel­
ing of the military hierarchy about civilian graduate education for 
senior officers this way. They said "Beyond exposure to the civilian 
community, it makes a difference who the officer studies with (sic).
The opportunity for exposure to value orientations at odds with military
conservatism and authoritarianism is far more likely in the campus class-
23
room than in the classroom shared by military officers alone." There­
fore, high level military officials prefer that senior military officers 
receive the "right" orientation by being trained in a strict military 
environment.
There are those who argue that advanced civilian education for 
large numbers of professional military officers is a luxury that the 
nation can ill afford, particularly since the method of validating the 
need for positions requiring graduate degrees leaves much to be desired. 
Leaving the determination of need to both the installation commanders 
and to the field commanders (e.g., Brigade and Battalion level comman­
ders and lower) often lead to requirements that appear to be unnecessary. 
For example, instances were found by the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
where one or more military positions in a command were designated as 
advanced degree positions when there were similar positions in the same 
command with similar job descriptions that were not selected. There 
were no reasons given for the selection of one over the other. Further, 
it appears that in several instances selection was made only because of
22
The National War College Experience and Its Utilization: A Study 
Among Graduates of The National War College and Supervisors of Graduates, 
p. viii.
23
Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education", p. 258.
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the incumbent holding the position. With little or no justification 
offered, and because of poorly written rationale for the selection of 
some graduate degree positions as opposed to those not selected, it is 
only natural that the veracity of the validation system should be held 
in question by staff personnel at higher headquarters and in the Con­
gress. Therefore, the need of military personnel with advanced degrees 
is usually a topic of conversation that engenders much interest among 
those who are opponents of the system. A better system for the vali­
dation of the needs of the.services is therefore indicated.
Civilian academic degrees have long been viewed by' many military
' ' ' 1 •
* officers as highly respected and desirable credentials. Many officers 
therefore perceive such a degree to be but one of many "tickets" re­
quired either for promotion and/or better assignments. Advancement of 
officers to positions of great responsibilities seems to support this 
contention. Although the military services have tried to discourage 
this type of thinking, they have been largely unsuccessful because large 
number of military officers still enroll in civilian colleges and uni­
versities on their own time in quest for an advanced degree. Further, 
analysis of promotion lists indicate that there is some validity for 
holding this attitude since it appears that persons with graduate degrees 
selected for promotion are increasing with each passing year.
One weakness of the system is the indifference held by civilian
leaders toward military programs. There are those who argue for the
/
"ciyilianization" (sic) of certain military positions (usually adminis­
trative or service jobs) by replacing the military professional with a 
civilian. Also, there are those who question the value of offering de­
grees in military subjects. All one has to do is to take a look at the 
catalogs of the various colleges and universities to determine the
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value placed on military degree programs. Outside of a few schools
like Duke University, the University of California at Davis, Ohio
University, etc. there are not many civilian colleges and universities
where one can obtain a masters degree or doctorate in strictly a mili- 
24tary major. Even at most of these institutions the concentration is 
usually in military or naval history and not phases of military inte­
rests that one finds at the Senior Service School. Of course, there 
are many civilian institutions of higher learning that offer isolated 
military related courses leading to degrees in other fields, but the 
academicians in charge of determining degree offerings haven't seen 
the necessity to expand these courses into military degree programs.
Old Dominion University (ODU) is a good case in point.
For a number of years, Dr. Carl Boyd and Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr. 
of the History Department at ODU, along with a number of their col­
leagues, have been offering a program of graduate studies in the His­
tory of Strategy and Policy. According to the bulletin explaining the 
offering, "the strategy and policy program at Old Dominion University 
is designed for members of the armed forces and others interested in 
examining the problems political and military decision-makers face in
25
situations involving the existence or application of military power." 
Here is a program that was developed from, and was an extension of, the 
strategy and policy curriculum created by Admiral Stansfield Turner at 
The Naval War College. It was therefore like no other program offered 
in a civilian institution of higher learning. At the same time, it
These three schools are among the foremost producers of Ph.D.’s 
in Military and Naval History. For further information regarding their 
programs and offerings in these areas, see: The Bulletin of Duke Univer­
sity Graduate School,*1981-82, p. 153; The University of California/Davis 
General Catalog (1980-81), p. 227; and Ohio Univ. Bulletin (June, 1980), 
p. 232.
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offered the same instruction that one could expect to obtain in strategy 
and policy at most, if not all, the Senior Service Schools. Just as at 
the Naval or Army War Colleges, participants in the ODU program could 
expect to "sharpen their analytical skills while developing a more in­
formed instinct for making judgments . . . t o  learn, to extend their perspec­
tives beyond direct experience through an intensive study of events,
26leaders and decisions." This program began as one which led to a cer­
tificate. The participants gained recognition for an emphasis in the 
history of strategy and policy upon completion of the required courses 
in maritime, naval or military history; and in diplomatic history, in­
ternational affairs, and in studies in the history of strategy and 
policy. Later, credits earned in this certificate program were approved 
for application toward the Masters of Art in History or in International 
Studies. However, this was the limit that the ODU administration was 
willing to go toward offering advanced degrees in a military program.
Dr. Boyd and Dr. Frank put together a proposal to offer a Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Military History and Strategic Studies based on the
27
certificate program. However, they were rebuffed in their efforts
even though the History Department at ODU gave them strong support. The 
State Council of Higher Education in Virginia, and even the administration 
at ODU, could not see the advantages of offering such a program despite 
the fact that the program was not duplicative of any offered in the state. 
Further they could not see that the program was designed to fill an un­
met need in the professional development of military officers, nor the
25
Strategy and Policy Bulletin, Old Dominion University, 1981.
26t..,Ibid.
27
Old Dominion History Department, "Letter of Intent for Ph.D. 
in Military History and Strategic Studies", circa 1977-1978.
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fact that ODU's location in Norfolk, Virginia would have assured great 
interest in the program by military and naval officers in the Hampton 
Roads, Virginia area. The fact that it would have been the only program 
of its type at a civilian institution of higher learning apparently did 
not make any impression on them. This short-sightedness on the part of 
civilian officials not only denied ODU a potentially prestigious program, 
and probably cost the university considerable revenue, but it removed 
any challenges to the programs offered at the five Senior Service Schools. 
Consequently, there remains no question about the requirement for the 
Senior Service Colleges from this aspect. Their reason for existence 
is substantiated since they are the only source of their type of program.
Franklin D. Margiotta aptly summarizes the position taken by
civilian leaders toward military higher education. He points out that
"In the Air War College and the National War College curriculum,
officers are challenged by intellects that are not mustered on one 
28
civilian campus." However, this pronouncement opens questions as to 
whether or not the curriculum at The Senior Service Schools is an advant­
age or disadvantage. Certainly, the fact that the curriculum at each 
of the Colleges is so very similar that questions arise regarding the 
need of the separate schools, and it appears to provide support to those 
calling for their consolidation.
The Clement's Committee on Excellence in Education, referred to 
in the preceeding chapter, repeatedly ran into suggestions for consoli­
dating the Senior Service Colleges because "First, . . .many of the same
28Franklin D. Margiotta, "A Comment on Taylor and Bletz's A Case 
for Officer Graduate Education: How Much is Enough?" in Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Fall, 1974) 2: 270.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
subjects [were] included in the curricula of all five colleges. . . 
Second, . . .the Senior Service Colleges, despite their ties to specific- 
mission related fields (Air Warfare in the case of the Air War College, 
Defense Management and Material Acquisition in the case of ICAF, etc.) 
[did] not represent a level of sophistication, authority, and recog­
nized expertise which substantiates a separate and discrete identity 
29
to each college." The committee generally rejected this approach, 
but could not overlook the subject altogether. The clarion call for 
consolidation was based on much substance and could not be completely 
ignored. For many years, The Senior Service Schools had mirrored their 
own special interests. Their student bodies, faculties and staffs 
were alike. The curriculum of each was very much alike. Even though 
there was a constant revision of the curricula almost on a yearly basis 
most of the Colleges taught the same or closely related subjects de­
spite their differing missions and objectives. Maureen Mylander sug­
gests a reason for this. She contends that the services' war colleges 
wanted to share the good fortune of The National War College which by 
the mid 1950's had gained a reputation as being the most prestigious 
of all the Senior Service Schools. (The fact that many officers of all 
services . considered the National War College superior to the other 
senior institutions led to a declaration by the Department of Defense 
that all the schools were equal and officers thereafter were permitted
to attend only one of the schools to satisfy senior professional educa-
30
tional requirements.) Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. argues that inasmuch
29
Office of The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report of The POD 
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Services Colleges: 
Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975),
p. 3.
30
Maureen Mylander, "The Colleges a Waster Resource," p. 7. 
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as the Defense Department had seen the necessity of giving equal 
recognition to each of the Senior Schools, and since the services had 
determined that attendance at any one of the schools would be given 
equal weight in determining promotional potential and future assign­
ments, there should be no concern that the curriculum of each was the 
same. "But, if an officer gets extra value out of attending the
National War College, then the service colleges should use a curriculum
31
distinctive from thatuused at[the National War College]." Vice 
Admiral Stansfield Turner dissents only slightly. In dismissing the 
apparent claim of competition between the services' war colleges and 
The National War College, he comments: "I see no reason why the curri­
cula should all be the same, even if they are all producing general/
flag officers. We have a need of a multitude of outlooks and back-
32grounds in the flag communities." Such differences of opinion con­
cerning curricula, coupled with short periods of staff and faculty 
assignments wherein many of the new people were anxious to put their 
personal stamp of influence on the institution, led to much churning of 
the curriculum at relative short intervals (every two or three years). 
With such constant changes, it stands to reason that sooner or later 
the Senior Service Schools would wind up teaching the same or like type 
courses. This resulted in somewhat a standard curriculum, and argu­
ments for such a standard curriculum were widespread.
31
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., "The War Colleges: Education for
What?" in The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. 
Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association Occasional Papers, 
No. 9 (Pittsburg: Univ. of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 118.
32
Ibid., p. 127. See note 3.
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Some officials of all services have argued that a standard cur-
riculum, which contains required core subjects with some electives,
imbues military students with certain basics that will serve them well
whatever their future. Those who take this position usually continue
their argument by pointing out "There are no textbooks, no identifiable
curriculum, and no halls of learning to teach military officers how to
33be generals, admirals, or senior airmen." As a result, military 
educators tend to rely on those courses used over the years in the pro­
duction of great leaders to supplement their practical experience.
As the opportunity to gain practical experiences, the primary 
training ground for success of military leaders, decreases more reli­
ance is placed on courses like senior leadership, human behavior, mili­
tary intelligence, communicative skills, military administration and 
management, logistics, command and control, and military science and 
tactics to provide each student a thorough grounding in skills that can 
be called upon by the individual throughout his professional career. 
Practical results of providing this type standard education to poten­
tial military leaders are well known. "Winston Churchill pointed out, 
in a visit to the United States in 1946, that it was the Senior Service 
Schools like the Army War College that prepared the Eisenhowers, 
Bradleys, Clarks, and Gruenthers for their massively responsible roles 
in World War II at a time when genuine practical experience with large
33
Franklin M. Davis, Jr., "The Dilemma of the Senior Service 
Colleges— A Commentary" in The System for Educating Military Officers 
in the U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association 
Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967),
p. 108.
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units and major operations was drastically limited by the miniscule
34size of the Army in which these officers were serving." What 
Churchill really tried to convey was that a standard war college cur­
riculum had produced officers who not only had a very high degree of 
confidence in their ability to deal with complex operational matters 
inspite of the lack of experience, but in whom others had just as high 
a confidence. It is hard to argue against this position when one 
considers that each of the leaders mentioned by Churchill were products 
of such a curriculum and Army Generals Creighton Abrams, James Polk, 
and Bruce Palmer; Marine General E.E. Anderson, and Navy Admiral James
Mayo, all of whom served heroically during later periods of national
35crisis pursued the same type curriculum.
The Clement's Board lends its support to some standardization 
while at the same time calling for mission-oriented courses, peculiar 
to each particular college, to be the primary feature of the curricu­
lum. It declared that officers attending the five Senior Service 
Schools share a number of the same educational needs; therefore, the 
institutions should put forth a collective effort in building a program
relative to the common needs, and these needs should form the basis
36of the common core subjects taught at each of the institutions. How­
ever at the same time, the committee recommended limiting the number 
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relevant to the institution be established. The Committee appeared 
to present a dichotomy.
One wonders, just where the board really stood. They straddled 
the fence. One can surmise that the reason for this indecisiveness 
can be found in the fact that each member of the board was not only 
a policy maker with ultimate responsibility for the institutions and 
procedures under review, but also that they were obligated to attain 
and to maintain the best schools for their various services. It is 
only logical that they should do nothing that would tend to discredit 
the institution that stood at the apex of their individual services 
school system. Yet, at the same time they had been charged with re­
viewing each of the senior programs, and determining how to improve 
them. In other words, they had to bring about excellence in higher 
military education while maintaining the integrity of their senior 
educational institutions. Therefore, the board members took a posi­
tion in the middle and did not solely advocate either a standard cur­
riculum or a mission-oriented curriculum. This vacillation had the 
effect of downplaying the importance of curriculum altogether as a 
factor related to determining the need of the Senior Service Colleges.
With this out of the way, the board could easily dismiss the 
calls for consolidation of some or all of the colleges, and could con­
centrate on devising guidelines in both subject and in administrative 
matters that would ensure perpetuation of the Senior Service Colleges 
while attempting to bring excellence to military higher education. 
Although this argument is plausible, it is nonetheless weak. It 
appears that something else is needed before one can completely dis­
miss curriculum as a factor of need. An argument that is most im-
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pressive, is the one that removes curricula as a criteria of need.
The notion advanced by Frederick H. Hartmann in his treatise, "The
War College in Perspective" contends "It is extremely difficult even
to determine what subject matter is taught in common from one war
college to another because the format and packaging and labeling is
all ’hand work' specially done at each institution, and often redone 
37each year." What Hartmann is implying is that it is very difficult 
to understand curriculum development in the Senior Service Schools 
because it was done differently there than in civilian institutions.
What followed was a course or series of courses combining bits and 
pieces from many disciplines. Therefore, there were really no standard 
academic courses at the Senior institutions. Rather, what one found 
were hybrid composites that were peculiar to military requirements 
and were put together for military use. As a result, courses in human 
behavior, management, leadership, for example, as presented in the 
military environment were not the same courses that were taught in the 
civilian colleges and universities. More importantly, they were not 
even the same courses taught from war college to war college because 
they were put together and revised at each institution. While they 
may have carried the same or similar title, their content, scope and 
even objectives were not necessarily the same. If there is anything 
from a curricular standpoint that provides compelling arguments in 
supporting the need for each of the Senior Service Schools, it would 
be this type of arrangement when courses would be subjected to tailoring.
37
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Franklin M. Davis, Jr. served as the Commandant of The Army War 
College for three years. During this time he became convinced that a 
tailored curriculum provided the best course offerings for a Senior 
Service School. He pointed out that because of the wide disparity 
of experience, professional perceptions, and quality among the stu­
dents, it was important that their needs be looked at carefully and a 
curriculum tailored to their needs. He further contended that the 
courses of study devised must challenge the student, must provide 
multiple opportunities for the individual to display his initiative,
and most important of all the courses must exploit the professional
38experience of the individual. A curriculum devised in such a manner 
would provide the individual with the maximum opportunity for study, 
research and fulfilling professional interests according to Davis. 
Military institutions are the most likely places to achieve this 
balance. Civilian institutions just could not afford the time and 
expense related to such tailoring. It would be difficult to disagree 
with this position. However, it points up a dilemma even for the mili­
tary Senior Service Colleges.
Only the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) of all the 
senior schools has done extensive work in tailoring. More important, 
the mission of ICAF calls for the type of courses that are more easily 
tailored than those in the other institutions. This tends to support 
the contention that tailoring courses is a factor in substantiating the 
need for an institution. However, does this issue of need argue for
38
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keeping only ICAF and the elimination of the rest of the Senior Service 
Colleges? Ratherj what this position seems to affirm is that the other 
institutions should do more tailoring of their courses not only to meet 
individual student needs, but also to meet the requirements of the 
institution itself.
As a result of examining curriculum as a determinant of reasons 
for the existence of multiple Senior Service Schools, I have concluded 
that each of the Senior Service Schools is needed to provide a specific 
type of indoctrination for its own service officers. At best, this con­
clusion is tenuous in light of other contradictory findings in this 
study. However, there are some considerations that must be addressed. 
First, advocates of consolidation of the senior level schools, or even 
the standardizing of the curriculum at the several colleges, have based 
their sentiment on administrative changes that would result and not on 
educational concerns. For example, such advocates have been more con­
cerned with organizational effectiveness, management improvements, and 
budgetary restraints than the subjects taught at the colleges, the rea­
sons for teaching them, and the achievements of their graduates. Second, 
advocates of consolidation have never gained the necessary support of 
either military or government officials to bring about a change in the 
structure of the senior level educational system. Rather, a combina­
tion of practical and parochial interests of the faculties, staffs, 
students and governing bodies of the several colleges, together with the 
support of high ranking military leaders and distinuished scholars who 
have conducted extensive research of the military education system 
have served to overcome most suggestions of consolidation. Third, 
where consolidation has occurred, the result has been the consolidation 
of administrative functions and not of curricular offerings. The best
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case in point is the National Defense University composed of the National 
War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces with more recently 
the addition of the Armed Forces Staff College. While the University 
exerts a certain amount of control over the component colleges, and 
even though the colleges utilizes various facilities in common and some­
times cooperates jointly on some outside lectures, they nonetheless re­
main relatively autonomous; particularly in the important areas of 
mission and of curriculum development. Based on the current missions 
of the senior level institutions, I can not foresee their consolidation 
beyond the National Defense University concept unless the defense 
priorities of the nation change or budgetary considerations forces such 
a move.
On the other hand, there are two findings that, in my opinion, 
suggests maintaining the status quo. The literature on senior level 
education overwhelmingly supports the notion that the major purpose of 
these colleges is to prepare professionals to successfully carryout the 
national will. It follows that since the national tasks assigned to the 
military have been divided according to separate services, the educa­
tion and training of the officers is best accomplished in accordance 
with separate service needs. Although the idea of common training needs 
of officers of various components of an armed force has enjoyed some 
success in a few other countries (such as Canada and Sweden), the idea 
has never caught on in the United States except for the education of 
officers of lower rank. One of the primary reasons is that uniform 
training of senior military officers is not practical as long as there 
are separate military services. I therefore can not foresee a need to 
change the current senior level educational system unless a willingness 
is expressed first to change the organizational structure of the armed
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forces. Uniformity of goals makes it possible to unify the service 
schools but differences in the implementation leads to rivalry among the 
branches of service and this establishes a need for the schools. Thus,
I have concluded that consolidation is not practical, and each senior 
college is needed. Amos A. Jordan, a distinguished researcher in the 
field of officer education says this about the prospects of consolidat­
ing senior level education:
The lack of enthusiasm within the services for this 
approach (or even for centrally directed studies of 
the question) is rooted in the virtually unanimous 
view among the professionals that schooling should 
be keyed directly to service personnel systems, 
which are themselves based directly upon service 
tasks. Thus the question is not merely one of 
service or joint schools, but of the very existence 
of the services themselves.39
If, then, each Senior Service School should be retained because of the 
current structure of the armed forces as I have suggested, curriculum 
becomes a major determinant of its need. There are of course other 
determinants of which demographics of students is another major con­
sideration.
One finds that the student body of a Senior Service College is
perhaps the most outstanding feature of the institution. Masland and
Radway emphatically calls it the most outstanding feature of The
40
National War College. The selection of students to attend the 
National War College remains the prerogative of each participating 
service or agency, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no command 
responsibilities in that respect. The military officers selected to
39
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attend The National War College usually hold the grade either of Colonel 
or Naval Captain. The civilians who attend the National War College 
are of comparable rank. Their average ages are usually between 42 and 
47. Class size at the National War College generally have been around 
200 or less. The same demographics hold true for the remaining Senior 
Service Schools. We usually find four or five officers from the other 
services, the State Department and perhaps other governmental agencies 
attending each of the service war colleges. Although proper military 
decorum has always been maintained, it has only been recently that even 
the wearing of the uniform has been required at some of the Senior 
Service Colleges. Other than these instances, one is struck by the 
fact that the student body holds very little else in common.
As individuals they come from different branches of the service and 
have varied backgrounds. They are markedly mixed in terms of experience, 
qualifications, educational backgrounds, and quality of professional ser­
vices. What this tells us, then, is that although the students who attend 
the Senior Service Colleges are alike in many aspects, they are nonethe­
less very dissimilar in many ways. Accordingly, they do not form a pattern 
that would permit one to say that they belong in one senior institution 
in opposition to another. Additionally, their training needs are dif­
ferent and is determined by the tasks they are likely to be assigned in 
the future. Since these tasks are based on the mission of the particular 
service to which they belong it is best to train them in institutions 
that are particularly akin to the service or agency from which they come. 
Although some common training might be feasible, mission essential 
training is not, it is the mission with its related tasks that overrides 
everything else. If, then, there is any argument in support of separate 
Senior Service Schools which is defensible, it would be one that is
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based on demographics and the needs of the services.
In retrospect, one finds arguments both for the consolidation 
and retention of the Senior Service Schools. However, because of the 
peculiar nature of military requirements, there appear more persuasive 
arguments for retaining the schools than arguments against them. Few 
individuals question that officers of the services should be educated 
to the extent necessary to carry out their assigned tasks in the 
interest of the security of the United States. There appears to be a 
continuing extensive requirement for training officers in the scientific 
and technological fields as well as: in the humanities, and in the pro­
fessions as well as in military science and tactics. Even though ques­
tions continue to center on the extent and nature of the educational 
requirements and on the number of graduate degrees required as well as 
on the extent to which the cost of graduate education should be borne 
by either the government or by the individual officer, there has been 
little disagreement over the fact that the major controlling factor in 
determining the educational requirements of the military services is 
the set of tasks the nation is likely to call upon its military pro­
fessionals to perform.^
The question of where should the service man be educated, in a 
civilian or military institution of higher education, has generated 
far more discussion than conclusive results. Many argue for sending 
the military officers to civilian colleges and universities because of 
the free academic climate that prevails there, and because of the 
fresh, new ideas that one can gain in that atmosphere. However, civil-
41
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ian academicians appear reluctant to offer graduate training in the 
type of programs that the military needs and desires for its profes­
sional officers. Offering studies in strategy and policy, industrial 
requirements and preparedness during periods of crises, and in the 
application of air, land and sea power in support of a national strategy 
appear of little interest in the civilian sector. Rather, these fields 
are left to the military and the Senior Service Colleges to cover. 
Further, many military officers, particularly those holding higher ranks, 
apparently view attending a civilian college or university as of little 
value to them and would rather attend the Senior Service Schools for 
the adyantages it apparently offers toward selection to flag and gene­
ral officer rank. Finally, while there appear to be certain simili- 
larities in curriculum and student demographics at the Senior Service 
School, we find that these similarities are only a matter of degree and 
not substance. Therefore, it seem that no overriding argument could 
be found to substantitate discontinuance of the programs at any of the 
Senior Service Colleges. There is, however, still substantial pressure 
for consolidating some of the courses, and the precedent for this has 
been set in the establishment of The National Defense University. The 
issue of consolidation of courses will be considered in the next chap­
ter as it relates to the findings and conclusions of this study.
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CHAPTER V I I
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the study was to examine the development of the 
National War College and its interrelationship with the remaining four 
Senior Service Schools. Concomitant to the central purpose a secondary 
thesis developed which dealt with reasons all the senior institution 
were necessary.
Evidence in the study supported the central thesis that the 
National War College was intended to be developed as the highest level 
institution of all the Senior Service Colleges. However, it was found 
that the National War College did not attain that position. Rather, it 
was discovered that the National War College shares the apex of military 
senior education with the remaining four Senior Service Colleges.
Evidence in the study does, however, provide some reasons for the 
establishment and continued existences of all of the senior institutions; 
perhaps because of differing missions and rivalry among the various 
branches of the military.
Research design for the study was devised to include the historical 
antecedents of military higher education in the United States that served 
as forerunners to the establishment of the National War College. Further, 
it was contended that an analysis of factors influencing the develop­
ment of each of the Senior Service Schools would help to provide insight 
not only into the founding of the National War College, but also into 
the reasons for the existence of each of the senior level military
138
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institutions. Further, an examination of the roles, attitudes and 
influences held by military and civilian leaders closely associated with 
the establishment of the Senior Service Schools was included in order to 
understand better how and why they developed as they did, and the causes 
for their interrelationship. Also, a critical look at curriculum develop­
ment and the development of instructional strategies at the various 
senior military institutions was added as part of the design in order 
to determine development of academic standards of the colleges and to 
reflect similarities and differences among the course offerings of high 
level military schools. Finally, a review of the reasons for the exis­
tence of the five Senior Service Schools was made a part of the research 
design in order to determine if any or all of the colleges were needed.
The basic premise in the study was that the National War College 
was planned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was developed to be the 
capstone military educational institution of the nation. Instead, the 
National War College shares the summit of professional military educa­
tion with the other four Senior Service Colleges. Evidence in the study 
essentially supports this contention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 
planned the National War College as the highest level educational insti­
tution in the Armed Forces. By the mid-1950's the National War College 
had achieved an unofficial reputation as being the most prestigious of 
all the Senior Service Colleges, and many officers of all services con­
sidered the National War College superior to the other senior institu­
tions. This fact is supported by the findings made by the Response 
Analysis Corporation, of Princeton, New Jersey. In the study made by 
the Response Analysis Corporation it was found that many military 
officers as late as the 1970's still perceived that the National War 
College was first in status and prestige when compared with the other
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four senior colleges. However, it was. this very consideration by 
military members of all the services which led the Department of Defense 
to declare officially that the Senior Service Colleges were equal in 
all respects; therefore, officers needed to attend only one of the four 
to satisfy senior professional educational requirements. To this end, 
it can be concluded that the National War College was planned and deve­
loped to be at the apex of the military educational system. Further, 
it was well on its way toward achieving this distinction, but was de­
emphasized by the military hierarchy to the point that it officially 
shares the summit of military higher education with the Industrial Col­
lege of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the three services war colleges.
Unofficially, however, the National War College still enjoys the 
reputation as being the most prestigious of all the Senior Service 
Schools. The research of the Response Analysis Corporation attest to 
this as does the findings of a Civilian Board of Consultants to the 
National War College who in 1973 examined the question of its pre­
eminence. The Board was concerned that the status and prestige of the 
college had been eroded over the years because of a decline in the 
quality of officers sent to the school and because of a drop in the 
number of its graduates who were promoted to flag or general officer 
rank. After extensive research, the Board was satisfied that the 
College had maintained its previous lofty position as the most 
prestigious of all the educational institutions of the Armed Forces.
A second hypothesis in this study was that the mission of the 
National War College and that of its sister institutions required a 
depth and breadth unique to each, and that this prevented either institu­
tion from becoming supreme in the military educational system. It was 
found in the study that curriculum development at each of the Senior
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Service Colleges was based primarily on the mission of the particular 
college, and this was intended to be the dominant factor in the curri­
culum at all the senior institutions. It was the breadth of the curri­
culum at the Senior Service Schools that made each different from its 
peers and made each of them unique.
It should be noted that in this respect, some evidence was found 
to support the idea that interservice rivalry contributed significantly 
to the depth and breadth of the Senior Service educational system.
There were instances found when interservice rivalry appeared during 
the development of the National War College such as the controversy 
over the selection of a name for this institution, and the fact that 
each of the services insisted on retaining its own war college when 
consideration was being given to establishing both the forerunner to 
the National War College, the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL), 
and the National War College itself. More significantly, interservice 
rivalry became a direct reason for the establishment of the Naval War 
College. Other than these instances, evidence of overt interservice 
rivalry was extremely scarce. Conversely, there was an abundance of 
evidence extolling interservice cooperation starting with the selection 
of Tasker Bliss, an Army Officer, to be on the original faculty of the 
Navy War College and continuing through the founding and development of 
ANSCOL, ICAF, and the National War College. Perhaps the most outstand­
ing example of interservice cooperation was the establishment and opera­
tion of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which was 
an activity established on November 9, 1962 by Joint Chiefs of Staff 
for the purpose of coordinating military education at the joint and 
Senior Service College level. The MECC was composed of the Presidents 
and Commandants of all of the Senior Service Colleges with the Commandant
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of the National War College as Chairman.
A third premise was that simple reasons all of the Senior Service 
Colleges exist seemed to be elusive. As the motives for founding each 
of the Senior Service Schools were reviewed, varied complex reasons for 
their existence were found ranging from experiences of war to inter­
service rivalry, and also from the desire to provide professional train­
ing of military members to establishing a place merely to house a general 
staff. These, and other ideological interests discussed in the study 
provided some insight into reasons for founding the Senior Service 
Schools, but they did not provide, as initially hypothesized, clear cut 
answers to the requirement for retaining each of the Colleges. However, 
discussions of the demands of the services for officers with graduate 
degrees, and of curricula offerings of the Senior Service Schools versus 
that of civilian colleges and universities, did provide some support for 
the continued existence of the multiple senior institutions. At best, 
one can conclude that there is substantial support among the military for 
separate Senior Service Schools, and there is a noticeable lack of argu­
ments against maintaining the institutions; therefore, in spite of the 
scarcity of hard evidence, there is sufficient support for continuation 
of the Colleges. Exploring the development of the National War College 
and its peer institutions, and examining their interrelationship, was 
a far less difficult task than determining requirement for the existence 
of all the colleges.
It was discovered early in this investigation that the antecedents 
of the war college system in the United States served as important his­
torical forerunners to the founding and development of the National War 
College and its sister Senior Service Schools. All of these institu­
tions in the United States can trace their heritage to precusors in 
Europe with the Berlin War Academy serving as the bellwether institution.
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The study established conclusively that the first military educational 
institution comparable to European war academies did not occur in the 
United States until the Naval War College was established. This was 
followed by the Army War College, the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces and ANSCOL the institution from which the National War College 
directly emerged. There are two other findings of concern with histo­
rical antecedents. First, the Air War College, because of the late 
date of its founding, does not serve as an important forerunner of the 
National War College. Second, the founding of the National War College 
partially fulfills the dreams held by many prominent individuals of the 
colonial period of American history for a national university. It was, 
however, the Naval War College that was the leader that brought advanced 
military education to the United States.
Although established on the general basis of European war schools, 
it was found that the Naval War College was the first of its kind to be 
established in the world. It had no model. The military schools of 
Europe were all army schools. Although the Naval War College founder, 
Stephen B. Luce, relied on the U.S. Army schools at Fort Monroe and 
Fort Leavenworth for much of his inspiration, he did not copy these 
schools in fostering the idea of a true war college. He emphasized the 
study of national strategy as a combination of sea and land power. This 
appeared more in the European tradition. Nonetheless, it was clearly 
shown that it was the Army that had success with its post-graduate 
training and the requirement for the same type training in the navy that 
appear to be the reasons for establishing the Naval War College.
The founding of the Army War College was less educational than 
bureaucratic according to findings of the study. The interim creation 
of a general staff and the establishment of a facility to house that
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staff became the immediate reasons for founding the Army War College.
There were revealed some subsidiary reasons that its founder, Elihu 
Root, and its chief patron, Tasker Bliss, had for wanting an army war 
college. These included expansion of higher education for Army person­
nel, the development and organization of a united army education system, 
and the provision of a coordinating agency for the dissemination of 
authorative military information.
The founding of ICAF and ANSCOL, like the Army War College, did 
not evolve directly from educational requirements of the services.
Rather, the primary reason for their establishment was experiences of 
actual war; ICAF because of industrial and logistical failures experienced 
during World War I, and ANSCOL because of the requirement for training 
in joint operations during World War II. If the reasons for the found­
ing of the Senior Service Colleges were few, the roles, attitudes and 
influences of individuals involved in Iheir founding and development were 
many.
One of the interesting findings of this investigation was that 
the senior military institutions had many enemies as well as friends 
during their formative years. The "technicists" are a case in point.
These individuals were primarily military officers who wanted to empha­
size training in technical skills at the expense of general military 
knowledge. Then there were Congressmen, Senators, and Service Secre­
taries who opposed the Senior Service Colleges. Even some of the 
students selected to attend the schools felt that they had been shang­
haied and did not support continuation of the Colleges. However, it 
was found that the supporters of the Colleges were more persistent and 
intent on prevailing. From Henry W. Halleck who served as Commanding 
General of the Army during the Civil War to Emory Upton who made a trip
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around the world to study the educational systems of other countries, 
supporters of higher military education in the United States were reso­
lute. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan were the prime movers in getting 
the Naval War College started. The primary patrons of the Army War Col­
lege were Root, Bliss, and William H. Carter. Henry "Hap" Arnold was the 
driving force behind ANSCOL while John L. DeWitt and Henry W. Hill made 
that institution a functioning reality. These supporters of higher 
education in the military faced up to old animosities against post­
graduate military education and the desire by many to maintain techni- 
cism as a basis for military professional development; and, they overcame 
the indifference and hostility of the enemies of senior education.
They got their schools started. The problem then became what to teach 
and how it should be presented.
Curricula and instructional strategies were important to the 
growth and development of military higher education in that they became 
the factors that tended to distinguish the Senior Service Schools from 
others in the educational system of both the military and civilian in­
stitutions of higher education. The findings revealed that it was the 
curriculum at each of the service institutions that made it different 
from its peers and made it unique in higher education. The findings 
support the contention that at few civilian institution of higher educa­
tion could a military officer of high rank receive instruction on the 
full range of factors, considerations and circumstances that bear upon 
their studies that one can obtain at the military Senior Servie Schools. 
At the beginning of these senior military colleges, work done by 
students in attendance was voluntary except perhaps attendance at lec­
tures. However, as time passed the work became more academic. The 
Naval War College is a case in point.
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Throughout much of its early development, curricular emphasis at 
the Naval War College centered around tactica],,.studies. However; the 
situation changed dramatically, after the close of World War II when 
the curriculum was broadened to include many matters not strictly naval 
or even military. Course objectives were raised from purely tactical, 
command and staff concerns to a much higher level of decision making. 
Courses were offered in subjects such as Strategy and Policy, Defense 
Decision Making, Management, Foreign Affairs, Human Relations, and 
Human Behavior as well as traditional non-tactical subjects as Inter­
national Law, History, Economics, and Sociology. The new curriculum 
emphasis marked a return to the original concepts of both Luce and 
Mahan who believed in the study of national strategy and policy as an 
essential element in understanding the art of war. To meet this end, 
the Naval War College poineered in using the lecture, the "applicatory 
method" of resolving problems, case studies, and war gaming as the 
major instructional strategies.
It was found in the evidence that in spite of efforts to modernize 
the curriculum at the Naval War College, there was increasing criticism 
of the efforts. For example, excessive attention to the Soviet Union 
and to the Soviet Bloc countries was deplored. Other main criticisms 
of the curriculum included the superficial treatment of its many sub­
jects, a rapid succession of visiting lecturers, an over concentration 
on the contemporary scene, and a corresponding under emphasis on the 
historical and sociological context in which current events were trans­
piring. It was against this background that Vice Admiral Stansfield 
Turner, in the early 1970’s, inaugurated a new course of study which 
included requiring students to take examinations, the giving of grades 
to students for the first time, and also requiring more student
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research, writing and case studies. In addition, Admiral Turner reduced 
the number of guest lecturers, eliminated the associated cooperative 
Masters degree program with George Washington University, established 
the procedures of studying strategy through historical cases rather 
than through international relations or political science, shifted 
emphasis away from broad issues of international relations into areas 
of more exclusive concern to naval officers, and he included the 
officer's wives in certain study programs to interest them in their 
husband's careers. The changes at the Naval War College were no less 
dramatic than those at the Army War College.
Deficiencies were recognized by the A m y  War College long before 
the Navy became cognizant of deficiencies at it College. The Army War 
College took measures early to revitalize its offerings. The A m y  War 
College "70 Study" of 1965 was a continuation of the Haines Board Study 
of 1964. The U.S. Army War College Mission and Curriculum Study of
1970, and the Norris Report of 1971 were follow-on studies. The re­
sults of these in-depth investigations and analyses of the curriculum 
were an increase in management studies, the application of behavioral 
science in leadership and management, greater use of automatic data 
processing, and a greater opportunity for individual research and study. 
One of the most important changes taking place in the Army War College 
Curriculum was the Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) undertaken when 
Major General Franklin M. Davis, Jr. was Commandant in the spring of
1971. The LRDP was in response to Davis' question concerning "How the 
school should respond to its responsibilities over the next decade in 
terms of curriculum content, instructional concepts, faculty develop­
ment and college organization"? The task of the LRDP, therefore, was 
to structure a curriculum which would anticipate and respond to
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civilian and military changes in the world and ensure that the course 
would equip graduates to lead and master the changes rather than be 
driven by them.
It was found that while the Army and Navy had set the standards 
for the teaching of strategy and policy subjects and for the training 
of students in decision-making, the other Senior Service Schools con­
tinued their distinctive curricular offerings of industrial subjects 
and courses dealing with air power. The curriculum of the Air War Col­
lege, for example, used the theme "airpower as an instrument of national 
policy." In carrying out this theme, the Air War College departed from 
the example set by both the Army and Navy. The Air Force decided to 
focus on the current air force missions and the capability to accomp­
lish these tasks especially as they relate to the NATO community. The 
Air War College was, therefore, less concerned with teaching its 
students high level strategy, policy and decision making than to ensure 
that they understood how Air Force operations influenced the national 
policy, strategy and decisions.
The ICAF curriculum was really unique unto itself because it was 
the only one of the Senior Service Schools dealing exclusively with 
resource management. Further, because of its type of curricular offer­
ings, the ICAF students possessed a high percentage of master and 
doctoral degrees on entering the institution than did their peers at 
the other high level military schools. It was also found that the ICAF 
courses were more like those offered in civilian colleges and universities 
because of their orientation toward business management and practices. 
However, because of these differences from the other Senior Service 
Schools and the sophistication of its students, ICAF found that it had 
a greater problem in designing its courses to fit the needs of every-
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one; therefore, this military college did extensive research in hoth 
tailoring courses to the background of its students, and determining 
methods to avoid duplication of previous education of their students.
Further it was found that the curriculum of the National War 
College was used as a prototype for courses leading to excellence in 
research and creative thinking. The curriculum was, therefore, devoted 
to broadening the knowledge and abilities of the students and to creat­
ing within the student confidence in the art of decision making. These 
attributes constituted the peak of excellence in higher education in 
the military. The emphasis placed on excellence was due in part to 
efforts made by the Department of Defense Committee on Excellence in 
Education (commonly referred to as the Clements Board). Members of the 
Clements Board determined the mission for each of the Senior Service 
Schools, established instructional strategies, and most important of 
all specified the kind of core, mission-essential and tailored elec­
tive that were considered to be the most logical for insuring educa­
tional excellence. Mission-essential courses were determined to be 
the predominate element of the curriculum.
There is little doubt that the Clements Board contributed to some 
standardization among the Senior Service Colleges and gave credence to 
those calling for consolidation of the senior military institutions.
In a large measure these institutions were similar. Members of 
faculties, the student bodies, instructional methods, and even organiza­
tions were similar to each other. An attempt to establish reasons for 
continued existence of all of the military colleges was facilitated by 
revelation of the separate and distinct missions assigned to each of 
these schools. Educational requirements of the military are controlled 
by the set of tasks the nation is likely to call upon its professionals
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to perform. Since each of the service tasks are likely to be different, 
the education of the officers of each service should also be different. 
Civilian institutions of higher education have not felt the teaching of 
military subjects is their responsibility and, therefore, the military 
institutions have provided the advanced military training. Finally, 
military officers realize that they receive status toward promotion to 
senior rank if they attend a military post-graduate school rather than 
a civilian institution. In light of the evidence examined in the study 
it seems reasonable to state that there are substantial reasons for the 
continued existence of each of the Senior Service Colleges.
In 1975, it was determine by the Clements Board that the National 
War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) 
should continue to be colleges in their own right but should be brought 
together in the form of a University of National Defense as soon as 
possible. This was accomplished on January 16, 1976 when the National 
Defense University (NDU) was established and resulted in an umbrella 
office of the President, a combined staff, and a new board of visitors 
to govern the new institution. Further, the libraries of the two con­
stituent colleges were combined, management and system functions of 
each school became one support activity, external programs and research 
activities were combined, and the new institution was given budgetary 
responsibilities. Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne, the first president 
of the National Defense University felt that such consolidation had 
resulted in a strong reservior of military educational excellence. 
However, at the same time the individuality and strength of the two 
separate component colleges have been retained. It appears to this 
writer that this consolidation succeeded primarily because the National 
War College and ICAF were both located at the same physical site.
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Further, both were already under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and were not closely associated with the philosophy of either 
of the three services. Finally, their missions were to teach courses 
that transcended service tactical and operational requirements. Because 
of these considerations, it was not only prudent, but also relatively 
easy, to accomplish the consolidation. This could not happen so easily 
with the three services war colleges. The differences in their 
philosophies and missions would prevent establishing a common curriculum. 
Interservice prejudices and rivalry could be so great that they would 
prohibit a consolidation. The only way that this writer can foresee a 
consolidation of the services war colleges with each other or with The 
National Defense University is after consolidation of all of the country's 
armed forces into one service. Consequently, the present arrangement 
appears adequate for military higher education given the current cir­
cumstances and conditions. However, there is one thing that is feasible 
based on the findings of this study. That is inasmuch as the National 
Defense University has the required stature, prestige and the mission 
requirement, it should be officially designated the capstone of the 
nation's military educational system with all the attendant responsi­
bilities and rewards such a designation would entail. In this context 
it would appear that admission to this capstone institution might 
naturally follow completion of the senior institution of the services 
rather than serve as an alternative to them.
In conclusion, the National War College was developed to be the 
apex of the military education system but it has never gained that 
official designation. Instead, it officially shares the apex of 
military higher education along with the four other Senior Service 
Colleges. It is concluded further that each Senior Service School has
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been viewed as requiring a depth and breadth in its offerings unique to 
each military service and that each institution’s mission contributed 
to this end. Finally, it is concluded that each of the separate institu­
tions should be retained as long as there are separate services and the 
schools have separate missions. It would seem to follow, however, that 
in today's world of combined military missions requiring interservice 
cooperation at the highest levels, an educational capstone for military 
education could be considered not only beneficial but essential. The 
National Defense University, if allowed to perform the function for 
which it was established, should meet such a need.
It would also seem to follow that future military mission require­
ments and budgetary considerations might eventually override parochial 
military interests and traditional interservice rivalry thus requiring 
a reorganization of the armed services. If this should occur, it might 
be necessary to review these finding and conclusions with a view of 
conducting a follow-on study on whether or not all the Senior Service 
Colleges should be retained.
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Abstract
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND PEER INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARA­
TIVE STUDY OF THE GROWTH AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF US MILITARY SENIOR 
SERVICE COLLEGES
Vernon Eugene Johnson, Ed.D.
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
Chairman: Professor Paul Unger
The purpose of this study was to investigate reasons for establish­
ment of the National War College, its interrelationship with other 
Senior Service Schools, and to assess why the multiple institutions con­
tinue to exist.
The study contained three hypotheses. First, the National War 
College was planned and developed to be the capstone of the nation's 
military educational system. It never achieved that position. Instead 
it has shared the summit of professional military education with the 
other four Senior Service Colleges. Second, the National War College 
and each of the other Senior Service Colleges had unique missions which 
prevented any institution from becoming surpreme in the military educa­
tion system. Third, although one could establish the interrelationships 
among the Senior Service Colleges, one could not assess readily the 
reasons the multiple institutions existed.
The present investigation is significant because the interrelation­
ship that exist among the National War College and the other Senior 
Service Schools seem to be misunderstood by the civilian sector and 
ignored by the military. The study attempted to clarify those relation­
ships for both elements.
It was hypothesized that by investigating the historical antece­
dents of military higher education in the United States one could better 
understand the development of the National War College and its inter­
relationships with the other Senior Service Colleges. It was also the 
contention of the author that an analysis of factors leading to the 
development of the Senior Service Colleges would provide insight into 
the reasons all the senior institutions exist today. Additionally, the 
author believed that one would have to investigate the roles, attitudes, 
and influences of military and civilian leaders as well as curriculum 
development and instructional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges 
before one could fully understand why they developed as they did.
It was concluded that all the Senior Service Colleges are re­
quired, and the present arrangement appears to be the best for military 
higher education given the current state of desires of military officials 
and indifference to military advanced graduate education by the civilian 
sector.
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